Financing, fire sales, and the stockholder wealth effects of asset divestiture announcements by Finlay, William et al.
Finlay, William and Marshall, Andrew and McColgan, Patrick (2018) 
Financing, fire sales, and the stockholder wealth effects of asset 
divestiture announcements. Journal of Corporate Finance, 50. pp. 323-
348. ISSN 0929-1199 , http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.09.005
This version is available at https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/57422/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to the Strathprints administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
The Strathprints institutional repository (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk) is a digital archive of University of Strathclyde research 
outputs. It has been developed to disseminate open access research outputs, expose data about those outputs, and enable the 
management and persistent access to Strathclyde's intellectual output.
Financing, fire sales, and the stockholder wealth effects of 
asset divestiture announcements 
 
William Finlay* 
Andrew Marshall** 
Patrick McColgan*** 
 
 
 
This draft: August 2016 
 
Abstract 
We examine the impact of financial distress conditions at the individual firm level, the operating 
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find that abnormal returns are significantly lower when firms divest assets during periods of 
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 1. Introduction  
The evidence that activity in the market for asset divestitures, and control of corporate assets 
more generally, varies significantly over time and across industries is one of the most consistent in 
corporate finance research.1 Time-series variation in activity can arise as a result of changes in the 
cost structure of an industry, changes in relative valuation of bidder and target firms, and as a result 
of financial distress conditions (Harford, 2005; Maksimovic and Phillips, 1998; Mitchell and 
Mulherin, 1996). In this study we examine how the market reaction to announcements of asset 
divestments varies with firm-level, industry-wide, and economy-wide financial distress conditions to 
allow us to isolate the distinct theoretical predictions.  
There are two main competing financial distress related hypotheses on the stock price 
reaction to asset divestments. The financing hypothesis proposes a positive stock price response to 
the divestment announcement, given the proceeds of the sale reduce the expected costs of 
bankruptcy (e.g. Asquith et al., 1994; Lang et al., 1995). Under this theory, firms choose to sell assets 
when divestments represent a lower cost source of financing than raising debt or equity and the cash 
injection to the firm has a higher present value than retaining control of the divested assets. The 
literature on financing benefits traditionally focuses on asset sales by divestors experiencing financial 
distress at the individual firm-level (e.g. Ofek, 1993; Denis and Shome, 2005) and not on the other 
definitions of financial distress. 
An alternative view is that when distress conditions impact on many firms simultaneously 
(industry wide distress) a negative stock price reaction to divestments is expected. For example, 
when distress conditions impact on all firms in an industry, the highest potential bidders are less 
likely to be in a position to acquire the divested assets, which increases the likelihood of asset 
purchases at lower values by non-industry buyers and as a result, assets are sold off at distressed 
                                                 
1 See Duchin and Schmidt (2013), Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), and Mulherin and Boone (2000).  
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prices. We refer to this as the fire sale explanation of divestments where distressed firms under 
pressure from creditors are forced to sell assets at a substantial discount to their fundamental value 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1992) and traditionally this has focused on industry-wide distress and not firm 
or economy wide distress.  
The two divestment reaction theories have not typically focused on economy-wide financial 
distress and therefore the impact of economy-wide financial conditions on the price received, and 
the stock price response to asset divestments is less examined and more ambiguous. As with 
industry-wide distress, economy-wide distress will lead to a reduction in asset value given lower 
FXUUHQW DQG H[SHFWHG IXWXUH SURILWDELOLW\ IURP WKH ILUP·V DVVHWV (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). 
Alternatively, so long as the economic shock is less than perfectly positively correlated across firms 
and industries there can still be a sufficient number of financially strong bidding firms to avoid fire 
sale discounts and preserve the financing benefits to a divestment. 
Tying these themes together, we propose that financial distress conditions facing the 
divesting firm, external market conditions, and the resulting availability of potential buyers for the 
divested assets are key determinants of the stock price response to divestment announcements. The 
financing hypothesis can explain a positive market reaction to divestments when there are sufficient 
high value buyers of the divested asset. However, when an increasing number firms seek to sell off 
assets at precisely the point when liquidity constrains are concentrated amongst the natural buyers of 
the divested assets. At this time, the divesting firm is forced to either postpone the sale or accept a 
bid below the fundamental value of the assets. Under such conditions, the fire sales hypothesis 
predicts a lower stock price response to divestment announcements.  
These conflicting arguments on fire sale costs and financing benefits in explaining the stock 
price reaction to divestment announcements and full consideration of the impact of different 
distress conditions on these theories motivates our paper. We aim to identify distinct periods of 
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firm-level, industry-wide, and economy-wide financial distress conditions, and periods when they 
overlap, to better isolate individual divestments most likely to be subject to fire sale costs and 
financing benefits. We argue that it is important to accurately define financial distress as either one 
of firm-level, industry- and economy-wide or combinations of them. Otherwise it is difficult to 
accurately define which of these effects will be more dominant in explaining the stock price 
response to asset divestments. 
A number of studies have empirically confirmed the presence of fire sale discounts for small 
samples of homogeneous asset sales during periods of industry-wide distress.2 We extend this 
evidence for a large sample of heterogeneous asset divestments, and importantly across a range of 
divesting firm characteristics and financial distress conditions.3 Borisova et al. (2013) point out that 
the opaque nature of the bidding process for divested assets increases the importance of firm-level 
and economy-wide factors in understanding the stock price reaction to divestment announcements. 
Therefore we examine firm level characteristics, and how they vary across our three financial distress 
conditions to influence the stock price response to divestment announcements. 
We examine these issues through an event study analysis of the stock price reaction to asset 
divestment announcements for 10,718 sales by non-financial UK firms from 1988 to 2009, 
comparing the reaction to divestments by firms during our three definitions of distress to non-
distressed (healthy) firms. This sample period allows us to isolate the impact of specific distress 
conditions on the stock price response to divestiture announcements as it  covers two recessions in 
1990/91 and 2008/09, the stock market crashes associated with media and tech stocks in 2001 and 
                                                 
2 For example, for commercial aircraft (Benmelech and Bergman 2008; Gavazza, 2010), contract drilling equipment 
(Kim, 1998), real estate (Campbell et al., 2011), automatic bankruptcy auctions (Eckbo and Thorburn, 2008), and mutual 
fund withdrawals (Coval and Stafford, 2007) 
3 Borisova et al. (2013) argue that in a large heterogeneous sample, examining abnormal returns for selling firms 
surrounding the divestment announcement serves as an indicator of the value received. This circumvents the difficulties 
in estimating the intrinsic value of divested assets across a large sample of unlisted assets. 
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the global financial crisis in 2008, and significant variation in industry-wide and firm-level distress 
conditions.  
Our study contributes to research on financial distress and asset divestments in two key 
areas. First, we directly test competing financing and fire sale explanations that lead to differing 
predictions on the stock price reaction to divestment announcements by more precisely defining 
conditions of financial distress and we isolate the distress conditions under which each effect is likely 
to be dominant. The literature has defined distress using a number of firm-level accounting and 
market based measures (Clayton and Reisel, 2013; John et al., 1992), industry-wide measures 
(Acharya et al., 2007; Schlingemann et al., 2002), economy-wide measures (Campbell et al., 2008; 
Kahl, 2002), and combinations thereof. However, to the best of our knowledge this is the first paper 
to examine how the stock price response to divestment announcements varies with each type of 
financial distress conditions in isolation, and also their interaction.  
Second, we extend prior literature on fire sale conditions to a larger, more heterogeneous, 
group of divesting firms, industries, and divested assets. Doing so allows us to exploit variation in 
distress and non-distressed conditions, and across divesting firm and deal characteristics, to directly 
compare investor perceptions of divestment announcements across different financial distress 
conditions. 
We provide empirical evidence that divestments made during periods of industry-wide 
distress, commonly associated with fire sale discounts, elicit a significantly lower stock price 
response. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue that under such conditions assets are more likely to be 
sold to low value non-industry users that will pay a lower purchase price. However, firm-level 
distress mitigates the lower response for industry-wide distressed sellers. We find some evidence in 
support of the financing hypothesis that asset sales are more beneficial to firm stockholders during 
periods of overlapping firm-level and economy-wide distress. These results suggest that fire sale 
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conditions prevail when firms divest assets during periods of industry-wide distress, but that the 
financing benefits at the firm level can offset the fire sale discount.  
Also, our examination of asset divestments during distress conditions highlights firm and 
deal characteristics that are important underlying drivers of fire sale and financing effects. Fire sale 
costs are restricted to the following sub-samples of divesting firms: (i) financially constrained firms 
with limited debt capacity who are likely to have been forced to divest under pressure from 
creditors, (ii) firms specifically selling the core assets expected to suffer liquidity discounts, and (iii) 
small firms expected to have limited access to external capital market funding as an alternative to 
divesting assets. Finally, we find some evidence that fire sale costs increase with the relative size of 
the divested asset, against suggesting liquidity discounts for the sale of larger assets.  
Collectively, these findings highlight the importance of precisely defining financial distress 
conditions for understanding investor perceptions of restructuring transactions. Our findings also 
highlight that prior evidence on the role of firm distress in the market response to asset divestments 
(Afshar et al., 1992; Lang et al., 1995; Lasfer et al., 1996) can under or overstate the financing 
benefits of divestments depending on the relative frequency of industry-wide and economy-wide 
distress conditions during the sample period.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we summarize prior 
literature on financial distress conditions and the stock price reaction to asset divestments and 
develop our empirical hypotheses. Section 3 outlines sample construction, variable definitions and 
research method. Section 4 presents our empirical findings and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical background and hypothesis development 
Empirical research on asset divestments finds that, on average, asset sales are associated with 
significant increases in stockholder wealth. A positive response is more often observed when the 
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divestment is associated with an improved focus on core assets of the selling firm (John and Ofek, 
1995) and the cash proceeds are used to pay-off debt holders rather than retained within the firm 
(Bates, 2005; Lang et al., 1995).  
In this paper we focus specifically on firms experiencing financial distress who raise cash 
through asset sales. This is important as in non-distressed conditions the market for the divested 
asset could be liquid and buyers easy to find for the divesting firm so they can sell the assets for a 
price close to the fundamental value (Schlingemann et al., 2002; Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). We 
expect the stock price response to differ for distressed firms and the direction of this difference to 
reflect competing financing and fire sales effects. 
Financing theories of asset sales propose that divestments allow the selling firm to obtain 
access to external financing that can otherwise be difficult, especially if the firm is experiencing 
financial distress. Asset sales can reduce the direct and indirect costs of bankruptcy where the cash 
received from the disposal reduces the probability of bankruptcy and the sale price achieved is close 
to the fundamental value of the asset. In such cases a positive stock price response to divestment 
announcements can be expected when the divestor is experiencing firm-level financial distress 
because the divestment represents good news about the price received for the asset (Lang et al., 
1995) and the proceeds can be used to reduce the probability of a bankruptcy event (Lasfer et al., 
1996).  
The fire sale explanation of divestments suggests that a need to finance liabilities falling due 
forces firms to sell assets in illiquid markets (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992, 2011). As such, the value 
received for asset sales is expected to be lower than during non-distressed periods for two reasons: 
(i) the present value of cash flows generated by the asset will decline with industry- and economy-
wide conditions and (ii) even at this lower fundamental value, sellers must offer a liquidity discount 
to induce low-value users to bid for the asset. During fire sale conditions, the stock price response to 
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divestment announcements will be discounted relative to healthy firms because the announcement 
conveys negative information about the price received for the divested asset and this can outweigh 
the firm-level financing benefits from the divestment. 
In the remainder of this section we discuss the impact of financial distress conditions on 
both the propensity to sell assets and the stock price response to divestment announcements. We 
extend prior literature by distinguishing across three distinct levels of financial distress conditions. In 
each section of the literature review we follow Shleifer and Vishny (1992) and explain financial 
distress in terms of a performance shock at the firm, industry, and economy level, and then we 
examine the impact of these distress conditions on the stock price response to divestment 
announcements. We develop empirical predications based on the relative importance of the 
financing and fire sales hypotheses to explain differences in the stock price response to divestment 
announcements between distressed and healthy firms.  
 
2.1. Firm-level distress 
The financing hypothesis of asset sales has in the past literature been most closely associated 
with individual firms. A firm experiencing an idiosyncratic performance shock and a resulting cash 
shortfall is likely to sell assets when the cost of raising new finance through security issuance proves 
prohibitive (Lang et al., 1995). Since fire sales are associated with a concentration of firms divesting 
assets within a short time frame, financial distress conditions for individual firms in isolation are 
unlikely to be associated with fire sale discounts. 
Consistent with this financing hypothesis, Ofek (1993) and Denis and Shome (2005) show a 
higher incidence of asset divestments for firms experiencing poor performance and have higher 
leverage and therefore could find external financing opportunities limited and/or expensive. 
Abnormal returns to sell off announcements are therefore expected to be higher for sellers 
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experiencing firm-level distress because the announcement signals a price received that is in excess 
of the cost of raising additional funding (Clayton and Reisel, 2013) and a reduction in the present 
value of bankruptcy costs (Lasfer et al., 1996). Empirical literature, in general, supports the financing 
explanation of divestments during firm-level distress conditions. Lang et al. (1995) find a positive 
stock price response to divestments motivated by the financing hypothesis where sale proceeds 
represent a source of finance that would otherwise be difficult to obtain. Afshar et al. (1992) and 
Lasfer et al. (1996) find higher gains for divestment announcements by financially distressed UK 
firms. Bates (2005) and Clayton and Reisel (2013) find that announcement returns to divestments 
increase with leverage ratios, and where the proceeds are used to repay debt, which indicates a 
reduction in the expected value of bankruptcy costs for these firms.  
Brown et al. (1994) provide evidence that is apparently contrary to the firm level financing 
benefits of asset sales. They find that abnormal returns are significantly lower for distressed firms 
who use the proceeds to retire debt relative to distressed firms that cite other uses for the 
divestment proceeds. They argue that such divestments are more beneficial WR WKH ILUP·VFUHGLWRUV
than stockholders. However, in their research financial distress is defined using information 
contained in the asset sale announcement and the divestments in their sample are more likely to 
represent forced sell-offs that can be better explained by the fire sale hypothesis.4  
Therefore, we follow the main empirical evidence and propose the following hypothesis for 
divestment announcements during firm-level distress: 
 
                                                 
4 Their findings are based on a small sample of 62 asset sales by distressed firms, do not distinguish between 
distressed and healthy firms, and are limited to very specific cases that explicitly cite the need to sell assets in order to 
pay off an existing or anticipated default, restructure debt, or to avoid bankruptcy as the motivation for the asset 
divestment. Given the specific definition of financial distress these divestment announcements are likely to contain new 
LQIRUPDWLRQRQWKHVHOOLQJILUP·VILQDQFLDOGLIILFXOWLHVDQGDVDUHVXOWLWLVGLIILFXOWWRLVRODWHWKHILUHVDOHHIIHFWRIa forced 
sale at a distressed price from any financing benefit to the intended use of proceeds. 
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Hypothesis 1. Stock price response is significantly higher for asset divestments during firm-level 
distress. 
 
2.2. Industry-wide distress 
In developing the fire sale hypothesis, Shleifer and Vishny (1992, 2011) propose that liquidity 
discounts for divested assets are more likely to arise under conditions of industry-wide distress. 
Industry-wide distress can lead to a lower price received for assets sold for two complimentary 
reasons: (i) the decline in industry conditions reduces the present value of cash flows from operating 
the asset, and (ii) the selling firm must offer liquidity discounts to make the assets attractive to 
potential buyers (Acharya et al., 2007). Industry competitors represent the highest value users of an 
asset and therefore should be willing to offer the highest price to the divesting firm. However, when 
the performance shock affects all firms in an industry then competitor firms experience the same 
short-term liquidity constraints and long-term debt overhang problems faced by the selling firm and 
DUHXQDEOH WRRIIHU WKH VHOOHU·Vminimum price for the asset. This increases the likelihood of asset 
purchases by non-industry firms who are only willing to buy the assets at lower valuations. Firm-
level financing benefits do still exist for divestments made during industry-wide distress conditions, 
but the stock price response to the divestment announcement is expected to be discounted in 
comparison to firm-level distress conditions given these fire sale costs. 
In an efficient market we expect that investors are aware of the decline in asset value given 
the declining stock prices and operating performance of firms in an industry. Therefore, the price 
reaction to a divestment announcement for firms experiencing industry-wide distress most likely 
reflects new information on both fire sale discounts offered to attract a buyer, which has a negative 
impact on stock price returns, and the financing benefit from a reduction in the present value of 
financial distress costs at the firm level, which would have a positive effect.  
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Industry-wide distress conditions are expected to impact both the likelihood of asset 
divestments and the price received for divested assets. Asquith et al. (1994), Pulvino (1998), and 
Schlingemann et al. (2002) find that divestments are more likely in industries that have liquid 
markets for asset sales. Kruse (2002) finds a positive relation between asset divestment likelihood 
and industry growth for poorly performing firms. Ramey and Shapiro (2001) find evidence of fire 
sale discounts in a sample of divestments by US aerospace firms. Acharya et al. (2007) find that 
industry conditions are a key determinant of recovery values following firm defaults. Marshall et al. 
(2012) find a significantly negative response to layoff announcements during the global financial 
crisis, which is most pronounced for firms in financial services industries. 
The above evidence supports the relative importance of the fire sales hypothesis during 
periods of industry-wide distress when firms are forced to sell assets at a price below fundamental 
value. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2. Stock price response is significantly lower for asset divestments during industry-wide 
distress. 
 
2.3. Economy-wide distress  
The impact of economy-wide distress conditions on the market reaction to asset divestment 
announcements is less well understood empirically and as not been the primary focus of the two 
competing theories subject to greater ambiguity theoretically. As with industry-wide distress, 
economy-wide distress will lead to a reduction in asset values given lower current and expected 
IXWXUHSURILWDELOLW\IURPWKHILUP·VDVVHWVAgain assuming market efficiency investors can anticipate 
the impact of this on the divestment price achieved and the market reaction to the divestment 
announcement reflects the difference between the price received and the price anticipated given 
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LQYHVWRU·VH[SHFWDWLRQVRIFXUUHQWDQGIXWXUHFDVKIORZVJHQHUDWHGE\WKHdivested assets at the time 
of the announcement (Borisova et al., 2013).  
Although much of the empirical research on fire sales has focused on industry-wide distress, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) propose that fire sale effects would be prevalent during both industry-
wide and economy-wide distress periods. They propose that when the economy is in a recession 
there are many potential industries that have to compete for the financing provided by deep 
SRFNHWHGSXUFKDVHUVRIGLVWUHVVHGILUPV·DVVHWV This creates fire sale conditions for divesting firms 
and would be associated with a lower stock price response to divestment announcements.  
An alternative explanation favors the relative importance of the financing hypothesis during 
periods of economy-wide distress. Given less than perfect correlation of financial distress conditions 
across industries and economies, Borisova et al. (2013) propose that a foreign buyer is able to pay a 
higher price for divested assets in comparison to financially distress domestic competitors. We 
extend this line of reasoning to suggest a potential financing benefit to asset purchases by non-
industry buyers during periods of economy-wide distress. As long as the economic shock is less than 
perfectly positively correlated across firms and industries within a single country there can be a 
potential pool of non-industry buyers that do not suffer financial distress and who therefore can bid 
up the price of the divested assets to reduce or eliminate the liquidity discount associated with fire 
sale conditions. If this is the case, the stock price response to divestment announcements during 
periods of economy-wide distress will be greater than for non-distressed periods and we expect that 
the result is driven by asset purchases made by non-industry acquirers of the divested assets. 
Empirical research on the likelihood of divestment, the price received, and the stock price 
response to asset sale announcements during economy-wide distress is also limited. Campello et al. 
(2010) show that financially constrained managers are more likely to sell off assets during the 
financial crisis of 2008. Alexandrou and Sudarsanam (2001) find that firms announcing asset 
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divestments during a recession experience higher abnormal returns relative to firms announcing 
during periods of economic growth. They attribute this to economy-wide distress forcing firms to 
divest poorly performing subsidiaries that lack strategic fit with the core assets of a firm. During 
periods of economic health such pressures are less prevalent. Similarly, Ang and Mauck (2011) find 
higher premiums in merger transactions during periods of economy-wide distress. Acharya et al. 
(2007) find no relation between economic conditions and value received from creditor recoveries.  
Given ambiguity in the relative importance of the financing and fire sale hypotheses of asset 
divestments under economy-wide distress conditions we propose competing hypotheses for its 
relative impact on stock price returns surrounding divestment announcements: 
 
Hypothesis 3a. Stock price response is significantly higher for divestments made during economy-
wide distress. 
Hypothesis 3b. Stock price response is significantly lower for divestments made during economy-
wide distress. 
 
2.4. Interaction of financial distress conditions  
In this section we extend our focus on financial distress to consider the overlap with firm, 
industry, and economic distress conditions that are expected to give rise to competing financing 
benefits and fire sale losses from the asset divestment. We suggest that the relative importance of 
economic, industry, and firm financial distress is expected to impact on the market response to asset 
divestment announcements. If the financing explanation dominates, we expect a positive market 
response to divestment announcements. If the fire sale explanation dominates, we expect a negative 
market response. 
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A small number of studies examine how financial distress measures at the economy, 
industry, and firm level interact to affect corporate restructuring decisions. Maksimovic and Phillips 
(1998) find that industry conditions are more important than firm specific Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 
explaining the asset sale and plant closure decisions of bankrupt firms. Kruse (2002) finds that 
divestment activity is more likely for industries that are growing and for non-distressed firms, 
suggesting that divestments are more likely when the market for asset sales is liquid and selling firms 
are in a relatively stronger bargaining position. Pulvino (1998) finds that aircraft sales by financially 
constrained firms are made at a discount to the average market price only in periods when the airline 
industry is distressed. This is driven by an increase in the likelihood of selling assets to low value 
non-industry users such as financial institutions, who are able to extract a higher discount from 
distressed selling firms. Eckbo and Thorburn (2008) find evidence of fire sale discounts in automatic 
bankruptcy auctions when the industry is suffering financial distress and the liquidation results in a 
piecemeal auction of assets. Where the firm is acquired as a going concern, no such fire sale 
discounts are observed. In contrast, Ang and Mauck (2011) find that merger premiums to financially 
distressed firms are actually higher during periods of economic distress.   
This summary of prior literature highlights the importance of identifying distinct financial 
distress conditions, in isolation and in combination, to understand the expected stock price response 
to asset divestments. Literature that examines firm-level distress  without consideration of the wider 
industry and economic context can produce potentially spurious conclusions on the underlying 
financial distress conditions that generate fire sale and financing arguments to explain the stock price 
response to divestment announcements. However, given the numerous possible combinations of 
distress conditions we do not propose formal hypotheses. We do note that conditions where fire 
sales are expected to be more prominent can lead to a less positive assessment of asset divestments. 
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3. Data and research method 
3.1. Sample construction 
The sample of asset divestments is collected from SDC Platinum over the 22-year period 
from January 1988 to December 2009 for firms with their primary listing on the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE). We collect the announcement date and other supplementary information including 
industry designation of the divested asset and the parent firm from this database. This produces an 
initial sample of 16,684 divestment announcements.  
We exclude financial and utility firms given their regulatory environment and government 
backing during the financial crisis.5 We also exclude announcements by firms in Datastream level 6 
industries with fewer than five firms to improve accuracy of industry-wide distress measures. We 
also exclude firms with missing or zero stock returns data for each day in the estimation and event 
windows. We retain only announcements by firms in the FTSE All-Share Index in the six months 
prior to the divestment announcement. This is to ensure the accuracy of the reported event dates by 
focusing on listed firms that receive greater media coverage. Focusing on firms in the All-Share 
Index also allows for more accurate measurement of firm-level financial distress conditions.6 We 
collect data on the FTSE All-Share Index constituents from Worldscope and the London Business 
School Risk Measurement Service. These filters produce a final sample of 10,718 divestment 
announcements.7  
                                                 
5 For example, UK Government backing of Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds Banking Group led the European 
Union competition commissioner to force asset divestments at these firms under regulations governing the provision of 
state aid. These divestments remain ongoing at the time of writing, several years after receipt of government funding and 
outside of the immediate industry distress conditions experienced during 2008. 
6 Kruse (2002) and Schlingemann et al. (2002) impose similar restrictions to identify divesting firms. We expect that 
smaller and younger firms are more likely to generate operating losses and rely on access to external capital markets to 
finance their operating losses in the early years after listing (DeAngelo et al., 2010). Financial distress prediction models 
that rely on poor accounting performance to identify distress are expected to be less accurate for these firms.  
7 Although we focus on FTSE All-Share index constituents, our sample is not limited to very large firms. The size of 
firms in our sample is smaller in comparison to those examined in Borisova et al. (2013) and Clayton and Reisel (2013) 
(comparison is approximate  given differences in exchange rates over time). The mean (median) market capitalization of 
our sample firms is £4,633m (£445m). The corresponding figures for deal value are £81.98m (£8.66m). Mean (median) 
market capitalization in Borisova et al. (2013) is $14,506m ($1,909m) and $299.8m ($55m) for deal value based on firms 
15 
 
 
3.2. Financial distress conditions and control variables 
We define financial distress at the firm, industry and economy level using a series of dummy 
variables that capture performance. This allows us to identify shocks to performance and cash flows 
that affect the incentives of firm to divest. Acharya et al. (2007) show that the effect of distress on 
the incentive to restructure is non-linear and therefore we use dummy variables, rather than 
continuous performance measures, to identify poor performance. 
We follow Bhagat et al. (2005) and John et al. (1992) and define firm distress (FIRM) where 
the divesting firm has reported negative net income for the financial year prior to the divestment 
announcement. Negative net income is an important event given the tendency for managers to 
attempt to smooth reported accounting income.8 
Several prior studies on industry-wide distress focus their definition on poor stock price 
performance alone (Gilson et al., 1990; Ofek, 1993; Opler and Titman, 1994). However, Acharya et 
al. (2007) find that supplementing stock price returns with declining firm revenues improves the 
predictive power of their industry-wide distress variable by 40%. Controlling for historical 
performance using revenues alongside stock return performance is also important to avoid look-
ahead bias in our measure of industry-wide distress. As such, we define industry-wide distress using 
both the measures proposed by Acharya et al. (2007) where firstly, industry-wide distress is based on 
poor stock price performance alone (IND 1), and secondly poor stock price performance and 
                                                                                                                                                             
selling assets to domestic buyers, which are insignificantly different from those firms selling assets to cross-border 
buyers. Clayton and Reisel (2013) set a minimum deal value of $75m for their sample of divestments, and as a result their 
sample contains larger firms than in Borisova et al. (2013) and this study. Thus, despite our focus on FTSE All-Share 
Index constituents, our sample is unlikely to be significantly biased towards very large firms in comparison to prior 
studies.  
8 Our results are robust to alternative definitions of firm financial distress. Following Asquith et al. (1994) we also 
define financial distress using a low interest coverage dummy variable set equal to one where the divesting firm has a 
ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) divided by total interest expense of less 
than 0.8 in the year prior to the divestment announcement or below 1.0 for two consecutive years prior to the 
announcement. Our results are also robust to defining financially distressed firms using the Taffler z-score for UK firms 
(Agarwal and Taffler, 2008). 
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negative revenue growth for the median firm in the same Datastream level 6 industry group as the 
divesting firm in the year prior to the divestment (IND 2).  
We define economy-wide distress (ECON) using the UK *RYHUQPHQWV·Treasury definition 
of two or more consecutive quarters of declining real gross domestic product. The UK experienced 
two recessions during our sample period; one lasting for five quarters from Q3 1990 and a second 
recession associated with the global financial crisis lasting for six quarters from Q2 2008.  
Also in our regression analysis we control for a range of additional firm and divestment 
characteristics that are expected to be correlated with announcement returns of divesting firms. We 
expect that firm size (FSIZE) is negatively related to announcement returns. This can arise where 
larger firms have better access to capital markets (Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995) and are therefore 
less likely to benefit from a reduction in financing constraints from divestments. Growth 
opportunities (MTB) can be positively related to announcement returns if returns are higher for 
firms with good investment opportunities to reinvest the cash received from the disposal (Bates, 
2005). We expect that related divestments (RELATE) are associated with lower abnormal returns 
given the gains to reversing diversification through asset disposals (John and Ofek, 1995). Industry 
liquidity conditions can also affect the likelihood of selling core relative to non-core assets 
(Schlingemann et al., 2002). We also include a repeat divestments dummy (CLUSTER) for frequent 
divestors. Stand-alone or infrequent divestment announcements are expected to convey more 
information to the market and we expect this variable to be negatively correlated with abnormal 
returns (Berger and Ofek, 1999). Alternatively, firms undertaking multiple divestments are amongst 
the most financially distressed and should benefit to a greater extent from any reduction in the 
expected costs of financial distress. Sample firms are matched to Worldscope to collect accounting 
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data at the financial year-end prior to the divestment. In our main regressions this matching further 
reduces the sample size to 9,713 observations.9   
In further sub-sample testing we examine the effect of low debt capacity and deal size on 
abnormal returns surrounding divestment announcements. In the fire sale model of Shleifer and 
Vishny (1992) firms with low debt capacity are more likely to be forced to sell assets at prices below 
their fundamental value. Following Pulvino (1998) we include a low debt capacity dummy (CAPLO) 
for firms that have book leverage above the industry median and a current ratio below the industry 
median.10 We anticipate that deal size (DSIZE) is positively related to announcement returns given 
the financing benefits from larger divestments (Lang et al., 1995). Deal characteristics are collected 
from the SDC record of the announcement. The inclusion of CAPLO and DSIZE reduces the 
number of observations in our regression analysis to 7,996 and 6,098 respectively.  
Panel A of Table 1 describes our financial distress measures associated with the financing 
and fire sale hypotheses. Panel B presents the definitions of our control variables. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Table 2 reports the number of divestment transactions classed as financially distressed. Panel 
A reports the number of divestment transactions over time for the full sample and across financial 
distress conditions and Panel B reports the number of transactions taking place during overlapping 
distress conditions separately for our IND 1 and IND 2 measures. We also report the breakdown of 
                                                 
9 To remove the effect of outliers, we winsorize the top and bottom 0.5% of all observations for our control 
variables.  
10 Following Pulvino (1998) we use book, rather than market, leverage to define low debt capacity firms. This avoids 
conflating financing constraints with the performance shock that we use to identify financial distress conditions since the 
performance shock will be correlated with changes in the market leverage ratio. 
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divestments across Datastream level 6 industry groups in Appendix A, which highlights industry 
years classified as distressed during our sample time period.  
Following general trends in merger activity, Table 2 shows a reduction in divestment activity 
in the last decade of our sample, following a peak in the late 1990s (Ang and Mauck, 2011; Duchin 
and Schmidt, 2013). Approximately two thirds of our sample does not experience any distress 
conditions at the time of the divestment announcement. For these firms, strategic motives, including 
the fit of the divested asset, are more likely to motivate the divestment. We address these motives in 
our regression models through the control variables. 
Divestments during periods of industry-wide and economy-wide distress are less frequent 
than during firm distress conditions. IND 1 divestments are concentrated during two recessionary 
periods (1990/91 and 2008/09) and the collapse of media and technology stocks in 2001/2002. The 
largest group of divestments by IND 2 distressed firms also occurs in 2001/2002 in media and 
technology related industries. Home construction and automobile industries also experience distress 
in the early 1990s and industry-wide distress associated with the global financial crisis in 2008 is 
dispersed across a number of industry groups including metals, machinery, home construction, 
industrial services, medical equipment and supplies, clothing and apparel, and publishing.11 There is a 
noticeable increase in divestment activity during periods of economy-wide distress relative to the 
years immediately preceding a recession, which supports the financing hypothesis. This difference 
highlights the importance in this paper of considering divestment activity under both industry-wide 
and economy-wide distress conditions. There appears to be distinctive features of industry-wide 
distress periods that explain the slowdown in divestments ² under the fire sale hypothesis this can 
arise due to a lack of potential buyers for these assets ² from economy-wide distress conditions that 
lead to a relative increase in divestment activity. 
                                                 
11 Unlike the US, the UK did not enter a formal recession in 2001/2002 and therefore this period is not classified as 
experiencing economy-wide distress for our sample firms. 
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[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Table 2 Panel A also highlights connections between our three measures of financial distress. 
Divesting firms are more likely to operate in distressed industries and have negative net income 
during recessionary periods. However, we do observe distinct periods of industry-wide and 
economy-wide distress and a recurring, albeit less frequent, number of divestments by distressed 
firms during each year of our sample period. This allows us to differentiate these effects in our 
empirical tests. We examine this issue in more detail in Panel B, which shows a clear overlap 
between industry-wide distress and both firm-level and economy-wide distress conditions. 58% 
(45%) of industry-wide distress divestments take place at firms simultaneously experiencing at least 
firm-level or economy-wide distress conditions for our IND 1 (IND 2) definition. This highlights 
the importance of precisely isolating financial distress conditions in understanding the stock price 
response to divestments. The proportion of divestments that take place during firm-level and 
economy-wide distress conditions in isolation is higher than for industry-wide distress, suggesting 
that these are more likely to represent discrete and idiosyncratic events at the time of the 
announcement.  
 
3.3. Event study 
We calculate cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for our divestment announcements using 
an estimation period from 190 to 31 days prior to the announcement date. Market model parameters 
are estimated with the FTSE All-Share Index as the market benchmark and t-tests of average CARs 
are calculated using the standard deviation of abnormal returns (ARs) from the estimation period. 
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We report event study CARs over the three-day window from day -1 to day +1 relative to the 
announcement date, day zero.12 
  
4. Stock price response to asset divestments and financial distress 
4.1. Summary statistics 
We now examine how firm and deal characteristics differ across financial distress conditions 
in a manner that can influence the motivation for the divestment, and therefore, potentially affect 
the stock price response to divestment announcements. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for 
firm and deal characteristics between distressed and non-distressed divestment firms. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Panel A separates divestments by firm-level distress. It shows distressed firms are larger than 
non-distressed firms and have weaker growth opportunities. We find no relation between firm-level 
financial distress and deal size, the likelihood of selling core assets, clustering of divestment activity, 
or the likelihood of being classified as a low debt capacity firm.  
Panels B and C separate divestments according to our two industry-wide distress measures, 
IND 1 in Panel B and IND 2 in Panel C. We find industry-wide distressed firms are smaller based 
RQ VDPSOH PHGLDQV DQG GLYHVWPHQWV UHSUHVHQW D ODUJHU IUDFWLRQ RI WKH ILUP·V DVVHWV CAPLO is 
unrelated to divestment activity across both measures of industry-wide distress. The mean FSIZE 
and MTB are higher, but this is driven by a small number of divestments by the largest firms in our 
sample. For the IND 1 distress group we find that divestors are more likely to sell core assets, which 
                                                 
12 The results presented in this paper are robust to wider event windows that can address concerns that divestments 
could contain information about the overall prospects of the divesting firm, which contaminates any financing or fire 
sale inferences contained in the immediate stock price response. Our results also hold for the two-day event window 
from day -1 to day 0 surrounding the announcement. 
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are likely to be those most subject to liquidity discounts given financial difficulties at industry 
competitors. IND 1 sellers are also less likely to make multiple divestments, but this finding does 
not hold for the more restrictive IND 2 measure of industry-wide distress.  
Finally, Panel D separates divestments by economy-wide distress conditions. We find no 
difference in firm size or deal size between distressed and non-distressed conditions. Unsurprisingly 
growth opportunities are lower during a recession. Divestments made during these periods are more 
likely to involve core assets and divesting firms are more likely to have low debt capacity.  
Overall, firms selling assets during firm-level and industry-wide distress conditions tend to be 
larger than the average divesting firm in our sample. Although we find that divestments during 
industry-wide distress are no more likely to be driven by low debt capacity, the finding that 
divestments during industry-wide distress periods are larger suggests that assets representing a higher 
proportion of firm value are being sold when fire sale conditions and a lack of industry buyers are 
most prevalent. The combined propensity to sell core assets and high firm-level financing difficulties 
during periods of economy-wide distress likely reflects a strong financing benefit to divestments 
during a recession. 
 
4.2. Financial distress conditions and stock price response to asset divestments 
We begin our event study analysis in Table 4, which presents univariate sorts of CARs 
partitioned between non-distressed and distressed firms. It shows the three-day CAR is significantly 
positive for all four groups of non-distressed firms and ranges from 0.74% to 0.94%. Similar levels 
of abnormal results are found by Borisova et al. (2013) and Sicherman and Pettway (1992). This 
positive announcement reaction supports theories of divestment based on operating efficiency for 
the selling firm and improved fit with the buyer.  
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In terms of our main analysis we find an average CAR of 1.05% (significant at the 1% level) 
for divestment announcements during firm-level financial distress conditions. The results are larger 
than those for non-distressed firms, but the difference in returns between non-distressed and 
distressed firms is not significant. As such, our findings do not support hypothesis 1 and the 
financing explanation of the market reaction to divestments. These results reject fire sales as the 
main explanation of the stock price response to asset divestments by distressed firms. Therefore, we 
suggest that any value loss from selling assets below fundamental value for these firms is outweighed 
by a reduction in the expected costs of financial distress.  
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Table 4 shows that divestments by firms in the IND 1 group generate insignificant CARs of 
-0.03%. These results are lower than the 0.94% average CAR for non-distressed firms, and there is a 
significant difference between the two groups (at the 1% level). The magnitude of this difference is 
more pronounced when focusing on the IND 2 measure of distress. The average CAR is -0.66% and 
the difference in returns between distressed and non-distressed firms is -1.57% (both significant at 
the 10% level or better). The more pronounced difference between distressed and non-distressed 
firms in the IND 2 group supports Acharya et al. (2007), who show that their refined definition of 
industry-wide distress utilizing both stock price and accounting data is a stronger predictor of 
recovery values following defaults than industry-wide distress based on stock returns alone. These 
findings support hypothesis 2 and are consistent with fire sales by firms experiencing industry-wide 
distress. This does not rule out financing as a motivation for the divestment. Indeed, the fire sale 
explanation implies that divestments are forced as firms must raise cash in order to meet liabilities 
falling due. Our results suggest that the fire sale effect outweighs any financing benefits for firms 
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experiencing industry-wide distress and leads to a significantly lower stock price response to 
divestments. This can arise where the natural buyers of the asset are also financially constrained and 
could be selling off similar assets. Under these conditions, the divested assets are likely to be 
purchased by lower value users who are willing to acquire the assets only at a significant discount to 
their fundamental value (Shleifer and Vishny, 2011).  
We find that the average CAR for divestments during periods of economy-wide distress is 
1.08% (significant at the 1% level). As with the findings for firm-level distress, the results are not 
significantly higher than those for non-distressed periods. Our findings are therefore inconsistent 
with the competing hypotheses 3a and 3b on the relative importance of financing and fire sale 
effects during periods of economy-wide distress, and suggest that no specific effect dominates 
during these periods. Contrasting our findings with those for industry-wide distress, and given the 
correlation between industry-wide and economy-wide distress shown in Table 2, our results 
highlight that the impact of economy-wide distress on divestment activity is distinct from the fire 
sale conditions associated with industry-wide distress in Shleifer and Vishny (1992).  
We extend our univariate analysis in Table 5, which presents regression results of event study 
CARs against financial distress conditions and our control variables for divesting firm and deal 
characteristics outlined in Section 3. Our summary statistics in Table 3 highlight that firm and deal 
characteristics that are correlated with divestments during distress periods vary with the nature of 
the distress, highlighting the need to control for these factors in our regression analysis. Our 
univariate analysis could also overstate the significance of differences in t-statistics between 
distressed and non-distressed periods due to cross-correlation of firm observations during periods of 
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industry-wide and economy-wide distress. To correct for this, we follow Duchin and Schmidt (2013) 
and cluster standard errors for each Datastream level 6 industry group in our sample.13 
Model 1 in Table 5 examines the impact of firm distress on CARs and reports a positive, but 
again insignificant and economically small, coefficient of 0.16%. This supports our univariate finding 
and suggests that firm-level financing benefits are unrelated to CARs surrounding divestments for 
distressed firms. Across all models we find that firm size is negatively related to CARs, but the 
remaining control variables are insignificant. We interpret this as suggesting that stockholders in 
small firms benefit to a greater extent from asset divestments because they are less easily able to 
mitigate financing constraints by raising funds from alternative sources. 
In the fire sale model of Shleifer and Vishny (1992) the divesting firm has defaulted on its 
debt and is forced to sell assets in order to repay creditors. However, Kruse (2002) develops a more 
relaxed version of this theory. Firms can experience a performance shock, but as they remain a going 
concern they may not be forced to divest assets. The decision to divest will depend on firm 
characteristics as well as the severity of financial distress conditions. Borisova et al. (2013) make a 
similar point on selection bias in the context of the choice to divest to a domestic or foreign buyer.  
To address this concern we use a Heckman (1979) treatment effects model to estimate the 
probability of divesting assets at time t relative to financial distress conditions and firm 
characteristics at time t-1. We estimate a probit model where the dependent variable is set equal to 
one if the firm divests assets at time t, and zero otherwise. Data is collected for all UK publicly 
quoted firms with available financial data in Datastream and we match this to data on divestment 
announcements from SDC Platinum.14 We examine the decision to divest against all three financial 
                                                 
13 Our results are unaffected if we correct for cross-correlation at the economy level and cluster standard errors by 
year. 
14 Our findings here potentially understate the degree of divestment activity by UK firms during our sample period. 
Oswald and Young (2004) note that SDC Platinum coverage is incomplete for repurchasing activity by UK firms during 
the earlier part of our sample period and it is possible the same may apply for our sample of asset divestments.  
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distress conditions and control variables from the models proposed by Harford (1999), Kruse 
(2002), and Pulvino (1998). We present these results in Appendix B. We then use these models to 
estimate the inverse Mills ratio, denoted as LAMBDA, as an additional control variable in second 
stage regression models of divestment announcement CARs. The inclusion of the required control 
variables to estimate LAMBDA reduces the sample size to 7,459 observations. We present two 
separate models in Appendix B, one for IND 1 and one for IND 2. In regressions where FIRM and 
ECON are the main explanatory variables we use LAMBDA calculated from Model 1, which uses 
IND 1 to estimate the probability of divestment.15  
Model 2 of Table 5 shows the results of the Heckman treatment model with FIRM as the 
main explanatory variable. The coefficient on FIRM distress is positive 0.40% and is weakly 
significant at the 10% level. The coefficient for LAMBDA is positive but insignificant in this and all 
of the regression models in Table 5, suggesting that factors associated with the decision to divest 
have not significantly biased our initial estimates. Our findings in Model 2 provide some support for 
hypothesis 1 relating to the firm-level financing benefits of divesting assets for firms experiencing an 
idiosyncratic performance shock.  
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
Models 3 to 6 examine the impact of IND 1 and IND 2 distress on CARs, with OLS 
regressions in the odd numbered columns and second-stage treatment regressions in the even 
numbered columns. Consistent with our univariate analysis, the coefficients for both our measures 
of industry-wide distress suggests that CARs are between 0.92% and 1.59% lower for divestments 
                                                 
15 Our results are unchanged if we use LAMBDA estimated from regression Model 2 or if we estimate regressions of 
the probability to divest against financial distress conditions individually. 
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during these periods (all significant at the 5% level or better). This provides strong support for 
hypothesis 2. Once again, the results are economically larger for the IND 2 measure of distress that 
uses both stock price performance and sales growth to identify distress. Even if one attributes the 
entire effect of IND 1 to revised future growth prospects in a declining stock price, there is a 
residual effect of industry-wide distress in our IND 2 dummy (Acharya et al., 2007). Our descriptive 
statistics in Table 2 highlights the relative infrequency of divestments during industry-wide distress 
periods, suggesting that firms are aware of the potential for fire sale discounts on divested assets and 
respond by divesting less frequently. Our results show that the lower price received for divested 
assets during industry-wide distress conditions is reflected in a significantly lower stock price 
response to divestment announcements for these firms. 
Models 7 and 8 examine the impact of economy-wide distress on divestment CARs. As with 
firm-level distress, the coefficient for ECON is positive and significant only in the treatment Model 
8. This provides partial support for the financing benefits to asset divestments during periods of 
economy-wide distress and is consistent with hypothesis 3a, suggesting higher returns to divestments 
during periods of economy-wide distress. At the very least the results allow us to reject hypothesis 
3b that fire sale effects lead to a lower stock price response to divestments during periods of 
economy-wide distress. During periods of economy-wide distress, any value loss in selling assets 
from a weakened bargaining position is outweighed by a reduction in expected costs of financial 
distress.  
Collectively, our results in Tables 4 and 5 show that during industry-wide distress periods, 
when the natural buyers of the divested assets are also likely to experience financing constraints, the 
fire sale effect results in a significantly lower stock price response to divestment announcements. 
Our findings for firm-level distress provide limited support on the financing benefits for asset 
divestments. We also provide new evidence on the potential financing benefits to asset divestments 
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during periods of economy-wide distress, which is by comparison noticeably underexplored in the 
empirical and theoretical literature. 
 
4.3. Debt capacity, fire sales, and financing 
Thus far our examination of financial distress conditions treats all firms equally, irrespective 
of the financing constraints they face prior to the performance shock. However, both the financing 
and fire sale theories of asset divestments SUHGLFW DQ LPSRUWDQW UROH IRU D ILUP·V GHEW FDSDFLW\ LQ
predicting the likelihood of divestment (Kruse, 2002; Ofek, 1993) and the stock price response 
(Brown et al., 1994; Lasfer et al., 1996). Under the financing theory firms sell assets because they are 
the lowest cost source of funding for a firm that needs to raise capital quickly (Lang et al., 1995). 
The cost of raising finance is expected to be greatest for firms suffering a liquidity shortfall and 
long-term debt overhang problems. As such, we expect that the potential financing benefits to 
divestment will be concentrated in the sub-sample of firms with low debt capacity. Likewise, under 
the fire sale hypothesis stock price returns on announcement are discounted when forced 
divestments take place during a period of industry-wide distress. In the original Shleifer and Vishny 
(1992) model firms are forced to sell assets, but in practice, industry-wide distress conditions are a 
determinant of the likelihood that divestment takes place (Pulvino, 1998). We expect that fire sale 
conditions and the resulting lower stock price response to divestments during periods of industry-
wide distress are concentrated in the sub-sample of divestments for firms with low debt capacity. 
To examine how debt capacity affects abnormal returns to selling firms around divestment 
announcements we add the CAPLO dummy variable to our OLS regression models in Table 5. 
Table 6 shows the coefficient for CAPLO is positive but statistically insignificant in Models 1, 4, 7, 
and 10, which examine each of our individual financial distress conditions. Therefore, divestment 
announcement abnormal returns are not driven by resolution of financial distress costs for the full 
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sample. This is not surprising as for the general population we would expect that divestments are 
driven by a variety of strategic motivations including refocusing on core operations (Berger and 
Ofek, 1999). The inclusion of CAPLO as an explanatory variable also does not affect the relation 
between financial distress conditions and CARs surrounding divestments announcements.  
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
Following our earlier discussion, we expect that financing and fire sale effects of asset 
divestments are restricted to the sub-sample of firms that are forced to sell assets to resolve financial 
distress. We identify these firms based on the CAPLO dummy and we estimate separate regressions 
of abnormal returns against financial distress conditions for low debt capacity and all other firms.  
In Models 2 and 3 of Table 6 we present these results for firm-level distress. For low debt 
capacity firms in Model 2, we find that returns are 0.80% higher for sellers experiencing firm-level 
distress (significant at the 5% level). For unconstrained firms in Model 3, abnormal returns for 
sellers experiencing firm-level distress are indistinguishable from non-distressed firms. This provides 
support for hypothesis 1 and the firm-level financing benefits to asset divestments for financially 
constrained firms. Firm-level financial distress conditions do not in isolation lead to higher returns 
for distressed sellers, but for firms experiencing financial constraints due to a combination of poor 
short-term liquidity and long-term debt overhang, divesting assets is expected to reduce the present 
value of the costs of financial distress (Clayton and Reisel, 2013). 
We examine the role of industry-wide distress in Models 5 and 6 (IND 1) and 8 and 9 (IND 
2) of Table 6, again partitioned by our CAPLO dummy. Our main result of a negative relation 
between industry-wide distress and abnormal returns surrounding divestment announcements is 
again restricted to the sub-sample of low debt capacity firms in Models 5 and 8. Announcement 
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period CARs for IND 1 and IND 2 are 1.71% and 2.76% lower respectively (both significant at the 
1% level) in comparison to non-distressed divesting firms. This can be explained by fire sale 
discounts when financially constrained firms are forced to sell assets, and provides strong support 
for hypothesis 2. Firms with low debt capacity that suffer short-term term liquidity constraints and 
long-term debt overhang are forced to sell assets at times when the natural buyers of these assets are 
also likely to be financially constrained, and as a result receive a lower price for the divested assets. 
Firms with spare debt capacity do not experience fire sale discounts during periods of industry-wide 
distress, as shown by the insignificant coefficients for IND 1 and IND 2 in Models 6 and 9 
respectively.  
In Models 11 and 12 we find no evidence that the relation between economy-wide distress 
and abnormal returns for selling firms surrounding asset sale announcements varies with selling firm 
debt capacity. Our results here fail to provide support for the relative importance of firm-level 
financing benefits for firms selling assets during periods of economy-wide distress, irrespective of 
whether the asset sale is likely to be have been forced by low debt capacity. At the very least our 
findings do again suggest an important distinction between industry- and economy-wide distress 
conditions in understanding fire sale discounts (Acharya et al., 2007). Fire sale discounts to asset 
sales are not present during periods of economy-wide distress for our sample of divestments. 
For our control variables, we find that firm size is negatively related to divestment returns in 
all regression models. For unconstrained firms we find a negative relation between MTB and 
abnormal returns (significant at the 10% level), which may be driven by free cash flow concerns 
when unconstrained managers have discretion to reinvest the divestment proceeds (Lang et al., 
1995).16 
                                                 
16 We exclude LAMBDA here and in subsequent tables since the variable is not significantly related to abnormal 
returns in Table 5. We perform additional untabulated regressions with LAMBDA as an additional control variable. We 
again find that higher returns to distressed to firm-level and industry-wide distress are restricted to the sub-sample of low 
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Overall, our findings for low debt capacity firms highlight an important channel through 
which financing and fire sale effects have a strong impact on announcement returns to corporate 
asset divestitures. To the extent that low debt capacity firms are more likely to have been forced to 
sell assets under pressure from creditors, the strong stock price impact under firm-level and 
industry-wide distress highlights that financing and fire sale effects are most important for financially 
constrained firms with low debt capacity. For unconstrained firms, strategic motivations are 
expected to be more important in explaining stock price returns surrounding the divestment 
announcement. 
 
4.4. Interaction of financial distress conditions 
Our previous findings in Tables 4 and 5 focus on individual distress conditions but do not 
consider the overlapping firm-level, industry-wide, and economy-wide distress conditions 
highlighted in Table 2. 6KOHLIHU DQG9LVKQ\·V  ILUH VDOHPRGHOHPSKDVL]HV WKH LPSRUWDQFHRI
industry-wide or economy-wide distress conditions over firm-level distress in creating fire sale 
conditions. If the performance shock that necessitates an asset sale is idiosyncratic to the firm, then 
potential buyers do not suffer the liquidity and debt overhang problems that prevent buyers from 
bidding the price of the asset up to its fundamental value in best use. By isolating various 
combinations of distress conditions we are better able to examine the impact of specific distress 
conditions on the market response to divestment announcements.  
Empirical research on the overlap of financial distress conditions suggests that industry-wide 
distress and resulting fire sale conditions outweigh any firm-level financing benefits to divestments. 
Maksimovic and Phillips (1998) find that industry conditions are more important than firm specific 
                                                                                                                                                             
debt capacity sellers. The inclusion of LAMBDA leads to the ECON variable becoming positive and significantly in 
Model 11 for the sub-sample of low debt capacity firms. As with Table 5, we find that LAMBDA is insignificant in all 
regressions, suggesting that selection bias has not significantly impacted on the results presented here.  
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Chapter 11 bankruptcy in explaining the asset sale and plant closure decisions of bankrupt firms. 
Also Kruse (2002) finds that divestment activity is more likely for healthy firms in growing 
industries. Overlapping financial distress conditions can also affect the price received for the asset, 
and therefore the stock price response to a divestment announcement. Pulvino (1998) finds that 
aircraft sales by financially constrained firms occur at a discounted price only when the airline 
industry is distressed. Eckbo and Thorburn (2008) find evidence of fire sale discounts in automatic 
bankruptcy auctions when the industry is suffering financial distress. Using the same z-score 
measure to identify firm-level financial distress as Afshar et al. (1992) and Lasfer et al. (1996), 
Alexandrou and Sudarsanam (2001) find a higher stock price response to divestments by non-
distressed firms, which is strongest during economy-wide distress conditions.17 In contrast, Ang and 
Mauck (2011) find that merger premiums to financially distressed firms are higher during economy-
wide distress periods.  
Given the financing benefit to divestments under firm-level and economy-wide distress 
conditions shown in Tables 5 and 6, our previous findings for industry-wide distress could 
understate the severity of the negative market reaction to divestments under fire sale conditions. As 
such, we now extend our focus on financial distress to consider divestments in periods that overlap 
with firm-level, industry-wide and economy-wide distress conditions.  
In Table 7 we present event study abnormal returns for each of the eight sub-samples of 
overlapping financial distress conditions outlined in Panel B of Table 2. Panel A presents results 
based on the IND 1 classification and Panel B presents our findings using the IND 2 classification 
of industry-wide distress.  
                                                 
17 Afshar et al. (1992) and Lasfer (1996) examine divestments made by UK firms in 1985 and 1986 whereas 
Alexandrou and Sudarsanam (2001) examine divestments over the period 1987 to 1993, which incorporates an 
economy-wide UK recession in the early 1990s. As such, direct comparison of the differing findings of these studies is 
difficult, but it is clear that sample time period and time-varying economy-wide prospects are likely to be a factor in the 
differing results. 
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In both panels we find abnormal returns of 0.93% (significant at the 1% level) for firms 
selling assets in the absence of financial distress conditions. We find support for the financing 
benefits of divestments during periods of combined firm-level and economy-wide distress. 
Abnormal returns are 1.99% and 1.57% respectively (both significant at the 1% level) and the 
difference relative to the non-distressed group is weakly significant at the 10% level in Panel A. We 
find no evidence that firm-level or economy-wide distress in isolation is associated with significant 
differences in CARs between distressed and no distress announcements, suggesting that our earlier 
results of a financing benefit under both circumstances is restricted to the sub-sample of divesting 
firms experiencing firm-level and economy-wide distress simultaneously.  
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
We again find evidence consistent with fire sale conditions during periods of industry-wide 
distress, both in isolation and when interacted with a period of economy-wide distress. In most cases 
the returns are insignificantly negative, but the difference between returns for divestments during 
industry-wide distress periods and no distress periods are significant and negative (at the 5% level or 
better). For example, during periods of industry-wide distress in isolation (combined with economy-
wide distress) the returns are 1.50% (1.24%) lower in comparison to divestments by healthy firms, 
when focusing on the IND 1 measure of distress. Our findings are even stronger for IND 2 distress 
conditions.  
We extend this univariate analysis in Table 8, which presents the results of regressions of 
CARs surrounding divestment announcements against overlapping financial distress conditions. We 
present results for the full sample and separately for financially constrained and unconstrained firms 
based on our CAPLO dummy, given the importance assigned to this variable in Section 4.3. To 
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define overlapping financial distress conditions we use only the included dummy variables for each 
distress condition.18 Models 1 to 3 in Panel A examine IND 1 distress conditions and Models 4 to 6 
in Panel B examine IND 2 distress. The reported coefficient compares abnormal returns for the 
included distress conditions group relative to the omitted no distress conditions group.  
Our regressions for the full sample confirm that industry-wide distress is the most consistent 
determinant of divestment returns in our sample. The coefficients for industry-wide distress in 
isolation (Models 1 and 4) are significantly negative and the differences of 2.12% in Model 1 and 
2.86% in Model 4 are economically large.  
 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
In contrast to our earlier findings in Table 5, we find no evidence of higher returns for 
divestments by firms experiencing economy-wide or firm-level distress in isolation, but inclusion of 
firm distress can mitigate the negative impact of industry-wide distress conditions on announcement 
abnormal returns. We also find that firm size is negatively related to divestment abnormal returns in 
all of our models and our remaining control variables are insignificant.  
For the sub-sample of low debt capacity divesting firms in Models 2 and 5, we confirm the 
negative relation between industry-wide distress and abnormal returns. We find that abnormal 
returns are significantly lower during periods of industry-wide distress for unconstrained firms, but 
the difference is economically smaller than observed for low debt capacity sellers. For the IND 1 
classification we also find support for the univariate result of lower returns during periods of 
                                                 
18 For example, the notation FIRM + IND + ECON indicates that the divestment announcement took place under 
firm-level, industry-wide, and economy-wide financial distress conditions simultaneously. The notation IND indicates 
that the divestment took place during industry-wide distress conditions, but the overall economy and the announcing 
firm were not distressed at the time of the announcement.  
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overlapping industry-wide and economy-wide distress within the sub-sample of financially 
constrained divesting firms, but the result is insignificant for the IND 2 measure of distress. 
For low debt capacity firms, we find evidence of a significant financing benefit to 
divestments during periods of overlapping firm-level and economy-wide distress. The returns are 
3.25% (3.20%) higher based on our IND 1 (IND 2) classification. Our results suggest that any 
financing benefit from divestments during firm-level and economy-wide distress in the previous 
section is due to the overlap of financial distress conditions, and are conditional on financing 
constrains due to short-term liquidity and long-term debt overhang problems.  
Collectively, these findings highlight a core contribution in our paper. The results of prior 
studies that consider individual distress conditions in isolation are likely to include divestment 
announcements characterized by more than one type of distress condition, and therefore, may under 
or overstate the relevant financing and fire sale effects of financial distress conditions. Our findings 
in this section confirm the importance of industry-wide distress and resulting fire sale conditions in 
understanding the stock price response to divestment announcements. The financing benefit of 
divestments within our sample is restricted to the sub-sample of low debt capacity firms 
experiencing both firm-level and economy-wide distress at the time of the divestment. If a recession 
increases the difficulty of obtaining external debt and equity funding for financially distressed firms, 
then asset divestments are more likely to represent the lowest cost source of financing for selling 
firms. 
 
4.5. Further determinants of financing benefits and fire sale costs to divestment announcements 
In this section we provide additional tests to further investigate the underlying determinants 
and drivers of the financing benefits and fire sale costs surrounding asset divestments by firms 
experiencing financial distress conditions. 
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4.5.1. Firm size  
Following Kruse (2002) and Schlingemann et al. (2002) we have constructed our sample to 
exclude divestments by very small firms, in our case by focusing on firms included in the FTSE All-
Share Index of the LSE. This reduces concerns surrounding completeness of data coverage in SDC 
Platinum and the use of firm-level accounting data as a predictor of financial distress for smaller 
firms listed on secondary markets. However, by focusing on FTSE All-Share constituents we impose 
two potential selection biases. First, financial distress conditions are expected to be less severe for 
the largest firms in our sample, who can more easily raise debt and equity capital as an alternative to 
divesting assets. This effect would lead to the financing benefits and fire sale costs of asset 
divestments being concentrated amongst the smallest firms in our sample and biases against our 
ability to detect a relation between financial distress conditions and divestment CARs. Alternatively, 
asset sales by larger firms within an industry could be subject to greater fire sale discounts if smaller 
industry competitors are unable to absorb larger asset sales. This would lead to fire sale effects being 
concentrated amongst the largest firms in our sample.  
To examine this issue we report separate regressions in Table 9 for large and small sample 
firms, where large firms are identified as those with book value of total assets above the overall 
sample median. In Models 1 and 2 we find no relation between firm-level distress and abnormal 
returns by both large and small sample firms. CARs are negatively related to firm size and growth 
opportunities for the sub-sample of large firms only. None of our control variables are related to the 
CARs for small firms and the explanatory power of our regressions for the sub-sample of small 
firms is generally low (the R-squared values are approximately half those of large firms and the 
regression F-statistics are insignificant for this group of divestments). 
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[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
In Models 3 to 6 we examine the role of industry-wide financial distress conditions. We find 
that the negative relation documented earlier in the paper is driven by the sub-sample of smaller 
firms in Models 4 and 6. Industry-wide distress is unrelated to abnormal returns surrounding 
divestment announcements for the largest firms in our sample. Finally, in Models 7 and 8 we 
examine economy-wide distress and find that the financing benefit to divestments is restricted to the 
sub-sample of small firms in Model 8.  
Our finding that fire sale costs during industry-wide distress and financing benefits during 
economy-wide distress is restricted to the smallest firms in our sample most likely reflects larger 
firms having easier access to external debt and equity markets even during times of financial distress 
conditions, reducing their need to sell assets at distressed prices when these assets are most illiquid. 
It also highlights that our focus on large firms most likely means that our empirical findings 
understate the true impact of financial distress on CARs surrounding asset divestments since the 
large firms in our sample have relatively easier access to alternative financing sources. 
 
4.5.2. Divestment of core and non-core assets  
We have previously identified industry-wide distress based on the overall divesting firm. 
However, the fire sale hypothesis primarily predicts that liquidity discounts and lower stock price 
returns on announcement are concentrated in divestments of core business assets. If divesting core 
assets leads to fire sale discounts, as in Shleifer and Vishny (1992), then we expect to observe lower 
abnormal returns to divestment of core assets during periods of industry-wide distress. As long as 
industry-wide distress is less than perfectly positively correlated across all industries in the economy, 
fire sale discounts should not be evident for divestitures of non-core assets. The financing 
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hypothesis, on the other hand, makes no clear distinction between core and non-core assets. The 
divested asset simply represents the lowest cost source of financing for the selling firm.  
We examine this issue in more depth by separating divestments between those involving the 
sale of core and non-core assets. We estimate separate regressions of abnormal returns for 
divestment of core and non-core assets based on the RELATE variable described previously and we 
report our findings in Table 10. In Models 1 and 2 we find no relation between firm-level distress 
and abnormal returns for firms selling core and non-core assets respectively, suggesting that benefits 
from re-focusing on core operations are unrelated to seller returns following a firm-level 
performance shock 
 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 
We examine industry-wide distress in Models 3 to 6. In Models 3 and 5 we find significantly 
lower abnormal returns of 1.20% and 2.55% respectively (both significant at the 5% level) when 
firms sell off core assets that are most likely to suffer from fire sale discounts. The coefficients for 
IND 1 and IND 2 are noticeably weaker for disposal of non-core assets in Models 4 and 6 
respectively and  weakly (not) significant in Model 4 (6) (at the 10% level). Our results here highlight 
that it is specifically those assets expected to suffer from fire sale conditions that lead to 
stockholders discounting CARs to divestment announcements.  
In Models 7 and 8 we examine how the role of economy-wide distress varies for core and 
non-core assets. We find no relation in Models 7 and 8 respectively. This again provides support 
against hypothesis 3b that periods of economy-wide distress should be associated with fire sale 
discounts on the sale of business assets, and confirms that industry-wide and economy-wide distress 
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conditions have different implications for the price that divesting firms can achieve when selling 
assets.  
Collectively, the results in Table 10 highlight an important aspect of fire sale costs from asset 
divestments. Fire sale conditions are most prevalent when firms experiencing industry-wide distress 
sell core operations since these are the assets that are most likely to be subject to liquidity discounts. 
Any discounts are expected to be small and insignificant when firms are able to dispose of non-core 
lines of business in healthy industries with an active market for corporate assets. 
We now extend this analysis to examine relatedness between the selling firm/unit and the 
acquiring firm/unit. We  identify related transactions where the acquiring firm/unit shares the same 
2-digit SIC code as the selling firm/unit. SIC codes for acquiring firms are again collected from SDC 
Platinum. When divesting firms sell assets to same-industry buyers we expect liquidity discounts to 
be most prevalent during periods of industry-wide distress and this can explain a lower stock price 
response to divestment announcements during these periods. If assets are sold to non-industry 
buyers during periods of economy-wide distress this provides evidence of potential financing 
benefits from selling assets to financially stronger buyers that are not subject the financial distress 
conditions affecting the divesting firm (Borisova et al., 2013). This allows us to provide direct 
evidence on the competing financing and fire sale hypotheses by examining who is acquiring the 
divested assets. We report these findings in Table 11. 
 
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
 
Beginning with firm-level financial distress, we find no relation between distress conditions 
and the relatedness of the acquiring and divesting firm. This supports the basic proposition that the 
divested asset is the lowest cost source of financing during a period of firm-level financial distress. 
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In the absence of liquidity constraints across industries and the economy there should be no direct 
relation between firm-level financial distress and the identity of the acquiring firm. 
During periods of industry distress we find no relation in Panels A and B between the 
operating industry of the divested unit and the acquiring firm/unit. However, we do find in Panels C 
and D that divesting parent firms are more likely to sell assets to acquiring firms/units in the same 
industry during periods of industry-wide distress (IND 1 in panel C and IND 1 and 2 in panel D). If 
same-industry acquiring firms are subject to the same industry-level financial distress conditions we 
expect there are fewer buyers for the divested assets and divested assets are more likely to be subject 
to the resulting fire sale discounts. 
Panels A and B also point to strong potential source of financing benefits during periods of 
economy-wide distress. The divested unit is significantly less likely to share the 2-digit SIC code of 
the acquiring firm/unit during periods of economy-wide distress in comparison to non-distressed 
periods. We interpret this finding as showing that during periods of economy-wide distress, assets 
can be sold-off to non-industry acquirers that are unlikely to be subject to the financing constraints 
facing the divesting firm. This supports the general framework outlined in Borisova et al. (2013) to 
explain the role of outside, in their case foreign, acquiring firms as liquidity providers in the market 
for divested assets. 
We extend this analysis in Table 12 to directly examine the impact of relatedness between the 
divesting firm/unit and the acquiring parent firm in explaining the stock price response to asset 
divestments. Panel A (Panel B) reports our findings for the full sample of divestment 
announcements based on relatedness between the divesting unit (parent firm) and the acquiring 
parent firm.19 We find weak general evidence that announcement period returns are higher 
                                                 
19 Our results here are unchanged if we examine the acquiring unit rather than the parent company. 
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surrounding divestments where the acquiring parent and divested unit share the same 2-digit SIC 
code. This provides evidence of the fit/focus hypothesis developed in John and Ofek (1995). 
 
[Insert Table 12 about here] 
 
Table 12 shows  that the significance of our results surrounding industry-wide financial 
distress are restricted to divestments where the selling unit/parent operates in a different 2-digit SIC 
industry to the acquiring parent (models 4 and 6). We interpret this result as supportive of the fire 
sale theory. When divesting firms are forced to sell assets to non-industry firms, these acquiring 
firms attach a lower value to the asset and are willing to pay a lower price for the purchased asset 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). Shareholders in the divesting firm recognize this at the time of the 
divestment announcement and react less positively to the announcement. This provides direct 
support for our explanation of the source of fire sale costs during industry-wide distress. Abnormal 
returns are lower when firms sell core assets and when assets are sold to non-industry buyers during 
industry-wide distress conditions. Pulvino (1998) finds that assets sold to non-industry buyers fetch 
a lower price, and in our study this is reflected in a lower stock price response to divestment 
announcements. 
Turning now to economy-wide distress, we find weak evidence in Model 8 that divestments 
to non-industry acquiring firms drive the positive stock price response to asset divestment 
announcements. This supports our previous explanation that financing benefits to divestments 
during periods of economy-wide distress can be derived from selling assets to deep pocketed 
acquiring firms. Economy-wide distress occurs when an abnormal number of firms and industries 
experience a performance shock. However, so long as the shock is less than perfectly positively 
correlated across firms and industries there can be a sufficient number of non-distressed acquiring 
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firms who can acquire the divested assets and reduce the liquidity discount associated with fire sale 
conditions during periods of industry-wide distress. 
We extend this analysis in Panels C and D of Table 12 where we consider  the sub-sample of 
small divesting firms previously identified in Table 9 as being an important source of gains during 
periods of economy-wide distress. Focusing on small firms sharpens our findings. The coefficient on 
our ECON dummy variables highlights announcement period abnormal returns that are 2.19% 
(1.76%) higher during periods of economy-wide distress within the sub-sample of small firms. We 
find no consistent evidence that financing benefits to firm-level and fire sale costs during periods of 
industry-wide distress are stronger for small firms. 
Overall, the evidence presented in Tables 11 and 12 support our explanation of the financing 
benefits to asset divestments during periods of economy-wide distress. The divested unit is more 
likely to be sold to a non-industry acquiring unit or parent. As long as economy-wide distress is less 
than perfectly correlated across industries then acquiring firms are less likely to be financially 
constrained and can bid up the price of the divested assets to reduce or eliminate the liquidity 
discounts associated with fire sale conditions. These findings are most pronounced within the sub-
sample of small firms that we identify as most likely to be financially constrained and for whom the 
financing benefits to the divestment are expected to be largest. 
 
4.5.3. Deal size  
The descriptive statistics presented in Table 3 highlight that deal size (DSIZE) is higher for 
divestments during periods of industry-wide distress, and is unrelated to firm-level and economy-
wide distress conditions. Thus far, we have omitted a control for relative deal size from our 
regressions given its limited reporting in SDC Platinum. However, Lang et al. (1995) and Lasfer et al. 
(1996) find that CARs surrounding divestments increase with deal size. Therefore, we re-estimate 
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our main regressions with additional controls for DSIZE and an interaction term between DSIZE 
and our four financial distress conditions. We propose that deal size can magnify the positive 
financing and negative fire sale effects of divestments. Following Lang et al. (1995), we expect a 
positive relation between deal size and CARs outside of financial distress conditions.  
We present these results in Table 13 and find that DSIZE is positively related to CARs in all 
models of financial distress. The positive coefficient for DSIZE is consistent with the financing 
hypothesis of Lang et al. (1995), where divestments are generally wealth increasing from the 
SHUVSHFWLYHRIWKHVHOOLQJILUP·VVWRFNKROGHUVDQGWKHVHJDLQVDUHLQFUHDVLQJZLWKWKHUHODWLYHVL]HRI
the divested asset.  
 
[Insert Table 13 about here] 
 
Inclusion of the interaction term between deal size and financial distress causes our industry-
wide distress variables to lose their statistical significance, but the interaction of DSIZE and 
industry-wide distress (IND 1) is significant and negative in Model 2.20 This highlights that, 
conditional on industry-wide distress conditions and the resulting fire sale costs, larger divestments 
are associated with larger fire sale discounts.21 We find no significant interaction effect between 
economy-wide distress and deal size surrounding divestment announcements and economy-wide 
distress is positively related to abnormal returns. Firm size remains negatively related to abnormal 
returns in all regression models.  
                                                 
20 It is specifically the inclusion of the interaction variables between deal size and distress that leads to our industry-
wide distress measures losing significance. When we re-estimate our regression models from Table 5 with only the 
additional control for deal size, industry-wide distress remains negative and significantly related to abnormal returns at 
the 5% level or better. 
21 This result is again driven by the sub-sample of low debt capacity divesting firms. 
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Our findings in Tables 3 and 13 highlight an important additional aspect to fire sale 
discounts for divesting firms during periods of industry-wide distress. Our findings here show that 
deal size magnifies fire sale costs for divesting firms during periods of industry-wide distress. 
Divestments during industry-wide distress periods involve the sale of relatively larger assets at 
precisely the time when the market for those assets is expected to be least liquid because the natural 
buyers of these assets experience their own financing constraints.  
 
5. Conclusions 
In this study we investigate how the stock price response to asset divestment announcements 
varies with financial distress conditions at the level of the individual firm, the operating industry, and 
economy-wide. We analyze a large sample of divestments by UK firms between 1988 and 2009 that 
covers significant variation in firm-level, industry-wide, and economy-wide distress conditions.  
We contribute to the literature on asset divestments by isolating the impact of specific and 
overlapping distress conditions on how markets respond to these announcements and by examining 
how firm and deal characteristics interact with these factors to influence abnormal returns. This 
approach allows us to examine fire sale explanations, as distinct from financing explanations of 
divestment announcements. Conflicting results from prior studies on the importance of these 
factors in explaining the market reaction across sample time periods and differing definitions of 
financial distress motivate our investigation. 
Our results consistently find that the market reaction to divestment announcements during 
periods of industry-wide distress is significantly lower than for non-distressed firms, which supports 
the fire sale explanation of asset sales. During periods of industry-wide distress the natural buyers of 
the divested asset are likely to also be distressed, which increases the likelihood of asset purchases by 
low-value users who are expected to pay a lower price for the divested asset. The stock price 
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response to divestment announcements is higher during periods of overlapping firm-level and 
economy-wide distress. We do not find a relation between firm-level and economy-wide distress in 
isolation and CARs surrounding divestment announcements. When firms divest assets during 
periods of industry-wide and firm-level distress, the stock price response to asset divestments is 
insignificant, which suggests that financing and fire sale effects offset. We also find that the effect of 
financial distress conditions on CARs to divestment announcements is restricted to specific firm and 
deal characteristics including low debt capacity, the sale of core assets, and small firms. Fire sale 
effects during periods of industry-wide distress are increasing with the relative size of the divested 
assets. 
Analyzing the role of financial distress conditions in the determinants of asset divestments 
relative to other types of corporate restructuring is a potentially fruitful area for future research. 
Schlingemann et al. (2002) find that the liquidity of the market for divested assets is a major 
determinant of asset divestments. We expect that firm-level, industry-wide, and economy-wide 
distress conditions can impact the liquidity of the market for corporate assets. This can also lead 
firms to engage in other non-cash generating corporate restructuring activities, such as employee 
layoffs and accounting write downs of firm assets (see Marshall et al., 2012). Examining the buyers 
of divested assets would also be an interesting extension of this study. On the one hand, divesting 
assets at discounted prices during periods of industry-wide distress FDQDOORZIRUDEX\HUV·PDUNHW
and generate abnormal returns for acquiring firms. On the other, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) propose 
that under fire sale conditions industry-specific assets are more likely to be sold to low-value and 
non-LQGXVWU\XVHUVIRUZKRPDGLVFRXQWHGSULFHIURPWKHVHOOHU·VSHUVSHFWLYHUHSUHVHQWVDIDLUSULFH 
Examining the role of financial distress conditions, buyer identity, and asset type in divestment 
GHFLVLRQVIURPWKHEX\HUDQGVHOOHUV·SHUVSHFWLYHis worthy of further study. 
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Table 1 
Variable definitions 
Variable Variable 
reference 
Description 
Panel A: Distress conditions  
Firm-level distress FIRM A dummy variable set equal to one if the divestment is made by a firm 
reporting negative net income before extraordinary items and preferred 
dividends in the financial year prior to the divestment announcement, and 
zero otherwise.  
Industry-wide 
distress 
IND 1 A dummy variable set equal to one if the divestment takes places during a 
calendar year where the median stock price return of all firms in the 
Datastream level 6 industry group is less than -30%, and zero otherwise.  
 IND 2 A dummy variable set equal to one if IND 1 equals one and the median 
revenue growth for all firms in the Datastream level 6 industry group is 
negative during the calendar year of the divestment, and zero otherwise.  
Economy-wide 
distress 
ECON A dummy variable set equal to one if the divestment takes places during a 
recessionary quarter, and zero otherwise. A recession is defined using the UK 
*RYHUQPHQW·V Treasury definition of two or more consecutive quarters of 
declining real GDP.  
   
Panel B: Control variables 
Firm size FSIZE Book value of total assets in £000s inflated to 2009 at consumer price 
inflation. 
Deal size DSIZE Price received for divested asset divided by book value of total assets at the 
financial year-end prior to the divestment announcement. 
Growth 
opportunities 
MTB Market value of equity divided by book value of equity. 
Related divestment RELATE A dummy variable set equal to one if the divested asset is in the same two-
digit SIC industry code as the parent firm, and zero otherwise. 
Repeat divestment CLUSTER A dummy variable set equal to one if the divesting firm had announced 
another divestment in the 180 days prior to the divestment announcement, 
and zero otherwise.  
Low debt capacity CAPLO A dummy variable set equal to one if the divesting firm had a leverage ratio 
above the industry median and a current ratio below the industry median, and 
zero otherwise. Industry medians are derived from Datastream level 6 industry 
groups. Leverage is defined as book value of total debt divided by book value 
of total assets. The current ratio is defined as current assets divided by current 
liabilities. 
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Table 2 
Divestment frequency and financial distress conditions  
Panel A: Divestment frequency and financial distress conditions over time 
Year Divestment frequency FIRM IND 1 IND 2 ECON 
1988 323 49 1 0 0 
1989 477 116 0 0 0 
1990 491 145 89 10 256 
1991 515 136 5 0 389 
1992 489 93 29 8 0 
1993 507 69 0 0 0 
1994 491 80 0 0 0 
1995 524 91 0 0 0 
1996 564 82 0 0 0 
1997 646 87 0 0 0 
1998 672 127 33 12 0 
1999 671 153 0 0 0 
2000 704 214 49 43 0 
2001 606 225 177 76 0 
2002 461 157 130 106 0 
2003 499 127 0 0 0 
2004 371 62 1 0 0 
2005 324 58 0 0 0 
2006 341 71 14 14 0 
2007 388 87 6 3 0 
2008 343 141 314 74 274 
2009 311 82 0 0 158 
Total 10,718 2,452 848 346 1,077 
      
Panel B: Divestment frequency for firms experiencing overlapping distress conditions 
 Divestment frequency 
 IND 1 IND 2 
Firm, industry-wide and economy-wide distress 122 23 
Firm and industry-wide distress 185 97 
Firm and economy-wide distress 217 316 
Firm distress only 1,928 2,016 
Industry-wide and economy-wide distress 189 38 
Industry-wide distress only 352 188 
Economy-wide distress only 549 700 
No distress conditions 7,176 7,340 
Total 10,718 10,718 
The table presents summary statistics for a sample of divestment announcements by UK firms from 1988 to 2009. The 
sample consists of non-financial and non-utility firms in the FTSE All-Share Index of the London Stock Exchange. 
Measures of financial distress are defined in Table 1. The exclusion of a distress category in Panel B denotes that the 
divestment took place during non-distress conditions in that category.  
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Table 3 
Firm and deal characteristics for distressed and non-distressed divestment announcements 
Variable 
Distressed 
Mean [Median] 
Non-distressed 
Mean [Median] 
T-test of means [Mann-Whitney-
Wilcoxon test of medians] 
Panel A: FIRM    
Number of announcements 2,452 8,266  
FSIZE 
8,801 
[1,054] 
6,903 
[880] 
3.80*** 
[1.88]* 
DSIZE 
0.100 
[0.020] 
0.097 
[0.021] 
0.28 
[-1.32] 
MTB 
2.728 
[1.546] 
2.861 
[1.698] 
-0.64 
[-4.93]*** 
RELATE 0.405 0.396 0.812 
CLUSTER 0.574 0.565 0.745 
CAPLO 0.418 0.407 0.885 
Panel B: IND 1    
Number of announcements 848 9,870  
FSIZE 
9,660 
[511] 
9,146 
[938] 
3.15*** 
[-5.30]*** 
DSIZE 
0.176 
[0.033] 
0.092 
[0.020] 
6.66*** 
[4.52]*** 
MTB 
4.846 
[1.707] 
2.668 
[1.656] 
6.65*** 
[0.44] 
RELATE 0.466 0.392 4.21*** 
CLUSTER 0.485 0.574 -4.99*** 
CAPLO 0.385 0.411 -1.46 
Panel C: IND 2    
Number of announcements 346 10,372  
FSIZE 
15,100 
[425] 
7,081 
[930] 
6.69*** 
[-4.03]*** 
DSIZE 
0.183 
[0.037] 
0.095 
[0.021] 
4.64*** 
[3.53]*** 
MTB 
5.840 
[1.703] 
2.731 
[1.662] 
6.34*** 
[0.14] 
RELATE 0.405 0.398 0.26 
CLUSTER 0.535 0.568 -1.24 
CAPLO 0.408 0.409 -0.04 
Panel D: ECON    
Number of announcements 1,077 9,641  
FSIZE 
7,201 
[1,105] 
7,348 
[887] 
-0.21 
[0.34] 
DSIZE 
0.107 
[0.020] 
0.097 
[0.021] 
0.78 
[-0.34] 
MTB 
2.251 
[1.531] 
2.896 
[1.694] 
-2.25** 
[-3.01]*** 
RELATE 0.469 0.390 5.023*** 
CLUSTER 0.561 0.568 -0.451 
CAPLO 0.498 0.400 5.44*** 
The table presents summary statistics and differences in means and medians across distressed and non-distressed firms 
for our sample of divestment announcements. Medians are reported in brackets below means. The significance of the 
difference in sample means is determined using a two-sample t-test. The significance of the differences in medians is 
determined in using the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test. All variables are defined in Table 1. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.  
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Table 4 
Cumulative abnormal returns surrounding divestment announcements and financial distress conditions 
Financial distress measure FIRM IND 1 IND 2 ECON 
Distressed 
1.05% 
(9.64)*** 
[2,452] 
-0.03% 
(-0.06) 
[848] 
-0.66% 
(-1.66)* 
[346] 
1.08% 
(4.60)*** 
[1,077] 
Non-distressed 
0.74% 
(12.68)*** 
[8,266] 
0.94% 
(11.54)*** 
[9,870] 
0.91% 
(15.82)*** 
[10,372] 
0.84% 
(15.19)*** 
[9,641] 
Difference 
0.31% 
(1.00) 
-0.96% 
(-3.19)*** 
-1.57% 
(-2.40)** 
0.24% 
(0.69) 
The table reports average thee-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding asset divestment announcements 
categorized by individual financial distress conditions. CARs are measured over the three-day event window beginning 
one day prior to the announcement date, day zero. Measures of financial distress are defined in Table 1. T-statistics are 
shown in parenthesis and the number of observations is shown in brackets. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level respectively.  
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Table 5 
Regressions of cumulative abnormal returns surrounding divestment announcements and financial distress 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS Treatment OLS Treatment OLS Treatment OLS Treatment 
FIRM 
0.0016 
(0.75) 
0.0040 
(1.76)* 
      
IND 1   
-0.0092 
(-2.66)** 
-0.0101 
(-2.78)*** 
    
IND 2     
-0.0159 
(-2.43)** 
-0.0135 
(-2.64)** 
  
ECON       
0.0048 
(1.44) 
0.0070 
(1.72)* 
         
LAMBDA  
0.0134 
(1.42) 
 
0.0137 
(1.42) 
 
0.0147 
(1.55) 
 
0.0135 
(1.46) 
LN (FSIZE) 
-0.0023 
(-3.54)*** 
-0.0027 
(-3.57)*** 
-0.0024 
(-3.61)*** 
-0.0027 
(-3.59)*** 
-0.0024 
(-3.66)*** 
-0.0027 
(-3.59)*** 
-0.0023 
(-3.55)*** 
-0.0027 
(-3.57)*** 
MTB 
-0.0001 
(-0.33) 
-0.0002 
(-1.57) 
-0.0001 
(-0.29) 
-0.0002 
(-1.43) 
-0.0001 
(-0.28) 
-0.0002 
(-1.51) 
-0.0001 
(-0.32) 
-0.0002 
(-1.56) 
RELATE 
0.0004 
(0.26) 
-0.0013 
(-0.72) 
0.0007 
(0.40) 
-0.0011 
(-0.62) 
0.0005 
(0.30) 
-0.0012 
(-0.71) 
0.0003 
(0.18) 
-0.0014 
(-0.78) 
CLUSTER 
0.0012 
(0.58) 
0.0018 
(0.74) 
0.0010 
(0.51) 
0.0016 
(0.68) 
0.0012 
(0.60) 
0.0018 
(0.75) 
0.0012 
(0.58) 
0.0018 
(0.77) 
         
Intercept 
0.0390 
(4.62)*** 
0.0192 
(1.20) 
0.0405 
(4.70)*** 
0.0206 
(1.23) 
0.0404 
(4.72)*** 
0.0185 
(1.14) 
0.0389 
(4.54)*** 
0.0191 
(1.22) 
         
Number of 
observations 
9,713 7,459 9,713 7,459 9,713 7,459 9,713 7,459 
Adjusted-R2  0.005 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.007 
F-statistic 4.86*** 4.46*** 5.13*** 4.64*** 5.72*** 4.04*** 5.43*** 4.87*** 
The table reports OLS regressions of three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding asset divestment 
announcements against individual measures of financial distress conditions and control variables. All variables are 
defined in Table 1. Heckman treatment regressions are estimated using a two-step procedure. LAMBDA is the inverse 
Mills ratio derived from probit regressions of the propensity to divest assets in Appendix B. T-statistics are shown in 
parenthesis and are derived from standard errors clustered at the Datastream level 6 industry level. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.  
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Table 6 
Regressions of cumulative abnormal returns surrounding divestment announcements and financial distress conditioned by debt capacity of divesting 
firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
Full 
Sample 
CAPLO
=1 
CAPLO
=0 
Full 
Sample 
CAPLO
=1 
CAPLO
=0 
Full 
Sample 
CAPLO
=1 
CAPLO
=0 
Full 
Sample 
CAPLO
=1 
CAPLO
=0 
FIRM 
0.0035 
(1.55) 
0.0080 
(2.33)*** 
0.0001 
(0.07) 
     
    
IND 1    
-0.0118 
(-2.78)*** 
-0.0171 
(-3.05)*** 
-0.0078 
(-1.41) 
  
    
IND 2       
-0.0195 
(-2.63)** 
-0.0276 
(-3.36)*** 
-0.0018 
(-1.01) 
   
ECON         
 0.0067 
(1.56) 
0.0100 
(1.50) 
0.0028 
(0.54) 
             
CAPLO 
0.0021 
(0.89) 
  
0.0021 
(0.90) 
  
0.0022 
(0.96) 
 
 0.0019 
(0.82) 
  
LN (FSIZE) 
-0.0026 
(-3.68)*** 
-0.0034 
(-2.48)** 
-0.0020 
(-2.60)** 
-0.0026 
(-3.81)*** 
-0.0034 
(-2.45)** 
-0.0020 
(-2.74)*** 
-0.0026 
(-3.85)*** 
-0.0035 
(-2.52)** 
-0.0021 
(-2.76)*** 
-0.0026 
(-3.68)*** 
-0.0034 
(-2.46)** 
-0.0020 
(-2.60)** 
MTB 
0.0000 
(0.07) 
0.0010 
(0.94) 
-0.0004 
(-1.90)* 
0.0001 
(0.13) 
0.0010 
(0.97) 
-0.0004 
(-1.92)* 
0.0001 
(0.14) 
0.0010 
(0.95) 
-0.0004 
(-1.94)* 
0.0000 
(0.07) 
0.0010 
(0.94) 
-0.0004 
(-1.88)* 
RELATE 
-0.0013 
(-0.73) 
-0.0026 
(-0.95) 
0.0001 
(0.04) 
-0.0011 
(-0.61) 
-0.0025 
(-0.93) 
0.0003 
(0.12) 
-0.0013 
(-0.75) 
-0.0030 
(-1.07) 
0.0001 
(0.06) 
-0.0014 
(-0.78) 
-0.0028 
(-1.05) 
0.0001 
(0.03) 
CLUSTER 
0.0012 
(0.55) 
0.0050 
(1.16) 
-0.0009 
(-0.33) 
0.0010 
(0.47) 
0.0044 
(1.07) 
-0.0010 
(-0.36) 
0.0013 
(0.58) 
0.0048 
(1.16) 
-0.0008 
(-0.32) 
0.0013 
(0.59) 
0.0048 
(1.17) 
-0.0008 
(-0.32) 
             
Intercept 
0.0425 
(4.66)*** 
0.0507 
(2.88)*** 
0.0374 
(3.55)*** 
0.0447 
(4.87)*** 
0.0538 
(2.97)*** 
0.0386 
(3.77)*** 
0.0443 
(4.89)*** 
0.0539 
(3.04)*** 
0.0381 
(3.80)*** 
0.0425 
(4.60)*** 
0.0513 
(2.88)*** 
0.0371 
(3.54)*** 
             
Number of 
observations 
7,996 3,235 4,761 7,996 3,235 4,761 7,996 3,235 4,761 7,996 3,235 4,761 
Adjusted-R2  0.006 0.016 0.007 0.007 0.017 0.008 0.008 0.018 0.008 0.006 0.016 0.007 
F-statistic 3.84*** 2.64** 3.10** 4.19*** 2.65** 3.12** 4.82*** 4.29*** 3.31** 4.11*** 1.85 3.05** 
The table reports OLS regressions of three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding asset divestment announcements against individual measures of 
financial distress conditions and control variables, conditioned by debt capacity of the divesting firms. All variables are defined in Table 1. T-statistics are shown in 
parenthesis and are derived from standard errors clustered at the Datastream level 6 industry level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
respectively.  
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Table 7 
Cumulative abnormal returns surrounding divestment announcements and overlapping financial distress 
conditions 
 CAR 
Difference to no 
distress conditions 
sample 
CAR 
Difference to no 
distress conditions 
sample 
 Panel A: IND 1 Panel B: IND 2 
     
Firm, industry-wide and 
economy-wide distress 
1.12% 
(0.77) 
[122] 
0.18% 
(0.25) 
3.12% 
(2.54)** 
[23] 
2.19% 
(1.31) 
Firm and industry-wide 
distress 
0.54% 
(0.82) 
[185] 
-0.40% 
(-0.67) 
0.97% 
(1.23) 
[97] 
0.04% 
(0.04) 
Firm and economy-wide 
distress 
1.99% 
(2.77)*** 
[217] 
1.05% 
(1.91)* 
1.57% 
(3.97)*** 
[316] 
0.64% 
(1.35) 
Firm distress only 
0.76% 
(4.23)*** 
[1,928] 
-0.18% 
(-0.86) 
0.73% 
(6.52)*** 
[2,016] 
-0.20% 
(-1.00) 
Industry-wide and 
economy-wide distress 
-0.31% 
(-0.32) 
[189] 
-1.24% 
(-2.08)** 
-1.77% 
(-1.39) 
[38] 
-2.70% 
(-2.06)** 
Industry-wide distress only 
-0.57% 
(-0.97) 
[352] 
-1.50% 
(-3.39)*** 
-1.73% 
(-3.57)*** 
[188] 
-2.66% 
(-2.93)*** 
Economy-wide distress 
only 
1.19% 
(3.05)*** 
[549] 
0.25% 
(0.71) 
0.94% 
(3.29)*** 
[700] 
0.01% 
(0.03) 
No distress conditions 
0.93% 
(9.97)*** 
[7,176] 
 0.93% 
(15.11)*** 
[7,340] 
 
The table reports average thee-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding asset divestment announcements 
categorized by overlapping financial distress conditions. CARs are measured over the three-day event window beginning 
one day prior to the announcement date, day zero. Measures of financial distress are defined in Table 1. T-statistics are 
shown in parenthesis and the number of observations is shown in brackets. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level respectively.  
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Table 8 
Regressions of cumulative abnormal returns surrounding divestment announcements and overlapping 
financial distress conditions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Full Sample CAPLO = 1 CAPLO = 0 Full Sample CAPLO = 1 CAPLO = 0 
 Panel A: IND 1 Panel B: IND 2 
FIRM + IND + ECON 
0.0129 
(0.91) 
0.0247 
(1.03) 
0.0023 
(0.17) 
0.0210 
(0.87) 
-0.0149 
(-0.76) 
0.0515 
(1.29) 
FIRM + IND 
0.0017 
(0.34) 
0.0104 
(1.16) 
-0.0091 
(-1.01) 
0.0076 
(1.13) 
0.0054 
(0.64) 
0.0023 
(0.35) 
FIRM + ECON 
0.0093 
(1.13) 
0.0325 
(1.80)* 
-0.0078 
(-0.74) 
0.0100 
(1.50) 
0.0320 
(2.39)** 
-0.0091 
(-1.28) 
FIRM 
-0.0009 
(-0.43) 
0.0014 
(0.42) 
0.0008 
(0.29) 
-0.0008 
(-0.40) 
0.0026 
(0.75) 
-0.0001 
(-0.04) 
IND + ECON 
-0.0115 
(-1.23) 
-0.0334 
(-1.68)* 
0.0068 
(0.53) 
-0.0320 
(-1.22) 
-0.0636 
(-0.95) 
0.0017 
(0.04) 
IND 
-0.0212 
(-2.45)** 
-0.0374 
(-2.69)*** 
-0.0169 
(-2.53)** 
-0.0286 
(-2.24)** 
-0.0368 
(-3.62)*** 
-0.0296 
(-1.88)* 
ECON 
0.0051 
(1.31) 
0.0107 
(1.21) 
0.0030 
(0.49) 
0.0030 
(0.96) 
0.0037 
(0.57) 
0.0046 
(0.76) 
       
LN (FSIZE) 
-0.0024 
(-3.70)*** 
-0.0035 
(-2.56)** 
-0.0021 
(-2.82)*** 
-0.0024 
(-3.68)*** 
-0.0035 
(-2.61)** 
-0.0021 
(-2.76)*** 
MTB 
-0.0001 
(-0.25) 
0.0010 
(0.94) 
-0.0003 
(-1.90)* 
-0.0001 
(-0.25) 
0.0010 
(0.93) 
-0.0003 
(-1.92)* 
RELATE 
0.0003 
(0.20) 
-0.0031 
(-1.16) 
0.0001 
(0.04) 
0.0003 
(0.16) 
-0.0033 
(-1.21) 
-0.0001 
(0.03) 
CLUSTER 
0.0010 
(0.50) 
0.0046 
(1.16) 
-0.0008 
(-0.32) 
0.0013 
(0.64) 
0.0052 
(1.28) 
-0.0004 
(-0.18) 
       
Intercept 
0.0406 
(4.82)*** 
0.0533 
(2.99)*** 
0.0386 
(3.84)*** 
0.0400 
(4.78)*** 
0.0528 
(3.05)*** 
0.0378 
(3.79)*** 
       
Number of observations 9,713 3,235 4,761 9,713 3,235 4,761 
Adjusted-R2  0.008 0.026 0.001 0.008 0.024 0.012 
F-statistic 3.21*** 3.08*** 1.75* 4.43*** 8.17*** 2.32** 
The table reports OLS regressions of three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding asset divestment 
announcements against overlapping financial distress conditions and control variables. To define overlapping financial 
distress conditions we use only the included dummy variables for each distress condition. For example, the coefficient 
FIRM + IND + ECON indicates that the divestment announcement took place under firm-level, industry-wide, and 
economy-wide financial distress conditions simultaneously. IND indicates that the divestment took place during 
industry-wide distress conditions, but the economy and the announcing firm were not distressed at the time of the 
announcement. Abnormal returns are tested against the group of announcements where the firm, the industry, and the 
economy are classified as not experiencing financial distress at the time of the announcement. All variables are defined in 
Table 1. T-statistics are shown in parenthesis and are derived from standard errors clustered at the Datastream level 6 
industry level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 9 
Regressions of cumulative abnormal return surrounding divestment announcements conditioned by firm size 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Large Small Large  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  
FIRM 
0.0019 
(1.09) 
0.0012 
(0.30) 
      
IND 1   
-0.0076 
(-1.25) 
-0.0110 
(-2.19)** 
    
IND 2     
-0.0113 
(-1.25) 
-0.0194 
(-2.10)** 
  
ECON       
-0.0031 
(-1.08) 
0.0130 
(2.01)** 
         
LN (FSIZE) 
-0.0023 
(-4.00)*** 
-0.0025 
(-1.26) 
-0.0022 
(-3.98)*** 
-0.0027 
(-1.34) 
-0.0022 
(-3.89)*** 
-0.0027 
(-1.35) 
-0.0023 
(-3.98)*** 
-0.0025 
(-1.23) 
MTB 
-0.0002 
(-2.19)** 
-0.0001 
(-0.17) 
-0.0002 
(-2.35)** 
-0.0001 
(-0.10) 
-0.0002 
(-2.26)** 
-0.0000 
(-0.09) 
-0.0002 
(2.25)** 
-0.0001 
(-0.15) 
RELATE 
0.0011 
(0.50) 
-0.0002 
(-0.07) 
0.0012 
(0.54) 
0.0001 
(0.06) 
0.0011 
(0.50) 
-0.0001 
(-0.03) 
0.0012 
(0.56) 
-0.0003 
(-0.12) 
CLUSTER 
-0.0020 
(-1.13) 
0.0034 
(1.11) 
-0.0023 
(-1.33) 
0.0034 
(1.08) 
-0.0021 
(-1.19) 
0.0036 
(1.15) 
-0.0021 
(-1.20) 
0.0033 
(1.07) 
         
Intercept 
0.0414 
(4.92)*** 
0.0406 
(1.74)* 
0.0409 
(5.06)*** 
0.0438 
(1.85)* 
0.0404 
(4.96)*** 
0.0434 
(1.86)* 
0.0417 
(4.93)*** 
0.0389 
(1.66) 
         
Number of 
observations 
4,850 4,863 4,850 4,863 4,850 4,863 4,850 4,863 
Adjusted-R2  0.005 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.006 0.003 0.005 0.003 
F-statistic 9.24*** 0.55 11.60*** 1.76 10.27*** 1.45 9.46*** 1.53 
The table reports OLS regressions of three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding asset divestment 
announcements against individual measures of financial distress conditions and control variables, conditioned by firm 
size. All variables are defined in Table 1. T-statistics are shown in parenthesis and are derived from standard errors 
clustered at the Datastream level 6 industry level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
respectively.  
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Table 10 
Regressions of cumulative abnormal returns surrounding divestment announcements and financial distress 
conditioned by relatedness of divested asset and parent firm  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
RELATE 
= 1 
RELATE 
= 0 
RELATE 
= 1 
RELATE 
= 0 
RELATE 
= 1 
RELATE 
= 0 
RELATE 
= 1 
RELATE 
= 0 
FIRM 
0.0035 
(0.99) 
0.0003 
(0.14) 
      
IND 1   
-0.0120 
(-2.22)** 
-0.0068 
(-1.76)* 
    
IND 2     
-0.0255 
(-2.66)** 
-0.0092 
(-1.30) 
  
ECON       
0.0020 
(0.37) 
0.0071 
(1.60) 
         
LN (FSIZE) 
-0.0021 
(-2.73)*** 
-0.0025 
(-2.89)*** 
-0.0022 
(-2.81)*** 
-0.0025 
(-2.94)*** 
-0.0022 
(-2.85)*** 
-0.0025 
(-2.93)*** 
-0.0021 
(-2.75)*** 
-0.0024 
(-2.86)*** 
MTB 
-0.0002 
(-0.99) 
-0.0001 
(-0.08) 
-0.0002 
(-0.89) 
-0.0000 
(-0.06) 
-0.0002 
(-0.89) 
-0.0000 
(-0.06) 
-0.0002 
(-1.00) 
-0.0001 
(-0.07) 
CLUSTER 
0.0010 
(0.36) 
0.0012 
(0.46) 
0.0007 
(0.26) 
0.0012 
(0.45) 
0.0009 
(0.33) 
0.0013 
(0.49) 
0.0010 
(0.39) 
0.0012 
(0.45) 
         
Intercept 
0.0367 
(3.47)*** 
0.0408 
(3.88)*** 
0.0396 
(3.75)*** 
0.0415 
(3.90)*** 
0.0397 
(3.79)*** 
0.0413 
(3.88)*** 
0.0374 
(3.56)*** 
0.0399 
(3.73)*** 
         
Number of 
observations 
3,869 5,844 3,869 5,844 3,869 5,844 3,869 5,844 
Adjusted-R2  0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.006 
F-statistic 2.89** 4.11*** 4.20*** 4.20*** 5.06*** 4.16*** 2.37* 5.13*** 
The table reports OLS regressions of three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding asset divestment 
announcements against individual measures of financial distress conditions and control variables, conditioned by the 
relatedness of the divested asset and parent firm. All variables are defined in Table 1. T-statistics are shown in 
parenthesis and are derived from standard errors clustered at the Datastream level 6 industry level. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.  
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Table 11 
Proportion of related divestments between buyer and selling firm conditioned on financial distress conditions 
 Distressed Non-distressed t-test difference 
Panel A: Seller unit ² Buyer unit    
FIRM 
0.3933 
[3,087] 
0.3987 
[10,359] 
0.5413 
IND1 
0.3860 
[1,070] 
0.3984 
[12,376] 
0.8019 
IND2 
0.3755 
[514] 
0.3983 
[12,932] 
1.0467 
ECON 
0.3632 
[1,382] 
0.4014 
[12,064] 
2.7844*** 
    
Panel B: Seller unit ² Buyer parent    
FIRM 
0.3341 
[3,047] 
0.3411 
[10,220] 
0.7177 
IND1 
0.3372 
[1,047] 
0.3396 
[12,220] 
0.1664 
IND2 
0.3347 
[505] 
0.3397 
[12,762] 
0.2345 
ECON 
0.3104 
[1,350] 
0.3428 
[11,917] 
2.4327** 
    
Panel C: Seller parent ² Buyer unit    
FIRM 
0.2710 
[3,096] 
0.2629 
[10,369] 
-0.8912 
IND1 
0.3016 
[1,071] 
0.2616 
[12,394] 
-2.7450*** 
IND2 
0.2802 
[514] 
0.2641 
[12,951] 
-0.7923 
ECON 
0.2715 
[1,385] 
0.2640 
[12,080] 
-0.5940 
    
Panel D: Seller parent ² Buyer parent    
FIRM 
0.2569 
[3,056] 
0.2497 
[10,229] 
-0.7998 
IND1 
0.2923 
[1,047] 
0.2478 
[12,238] 
-3.0443*** 
IND2 
0.2911 
[505] 
0.2498 
[12,780] 
-2.0066** 
ECON 
0.2604 
[1,352] 
0.2503 
[11,933] 
-0.7981 
The table reports the proportion of related divesting and acquiring firms/units where the divesting firm and or unit are 
identified as sharing the same 2-digit SIC code as the acquiring firm/unit and results are separated between financial 
distress and non-distress conditions. We identify SIC codes for the divesting firm/unit and acquiring firm/unit from 
SDC Platinum. Related divestments are identified as those where the seller and buyer share the same 2-digit SIC code. 
The proportion of total divestments that are related is reported above the number of observations in brackets. ***, **, 
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 12 
Regressions of cumulative abnormal returns surrounding divestment announcements conditioned on buyer-
seller relatedness 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Related Unrelated Related Unrelated Related Unrelated Related Unrelated 
  
Panel A: Seller unit ² Buyer parent 
FIRM 
0.0054 
(1.83)* 
-0.0005 
(-0.17) 
      
IND1   
-0.0098 
(-1.58) 
-0.0088 
(-2.02)** 
    
IND2     
-0.0060 
(-0.54) 
-0.0207 
(-2.35)** 
  
ECON       
-0.0029 
(-0.53) 
0.0087 
(1.70)* 
         
LN (FSIZE) 
-0.0023 
(-2.99)*** 
-0.0024 
(-2.78)*** 
-0.0024 
(-3.11)*** 
-0.0025 
(-2.82)*** 
-0.0024 
(-3.04)*** 
-0.0025 
(-2.88)*** 
-0.0023 
(-3.01)*** 
-0.0024 
(-2.79)*** 
MTB 
0.0000 
(0.00) 
-0.0002 
(-0.37) 
0.0000 
(0.11) 
-0.0002 
(-0.34) 
0.0000 
(0.03) 
-0.0002 
(-0.32) 
-0.0000 
(-0.02) 
-0.0002 
(-0.35) 
RELATE 
0.0042 
(1.53) 
-0.0017 
(-0.83) 
0.0046 
(1.65) 
-0.0016 
(-0.77) 
0.0043 
(1.56) 
-0.0018 
(-0.84) 
0.0043 
(1.57) 
-0.0020 
(-0.98) 
CLUSTER 
0.0049 
(1.47) 
-0.0010 
(-0.38) 
0.0048 
(1.44) 
-0.0011 
(-0.42) 
0.0049 
(1.47) 
-0.0008 
(-0.30) 
0.0049 
(1.48) 
-0.0010 
(-0.39) 
Intercept 
0.0341 
(3.23)*** 
0.0427 
(3.75)*** 
0.0367 
(3.49)*** 
0.0437 
(3.74)*** 
0.0356 
(3.36)*** 
0.0441 
(3.79)*** 
0.0355 
(3.39)*** 
0.0418 
(3.64)*** 
Number of 
observations 
3,337 6,223 3,337 6,223 3,337 6,223 3,337 6,223 
Adjusted-R2  0.007 0.005 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.006 
F-statistic 2.323* 3.513*** 3.731*** 3.387*** 2.767** 3.570*** 3.067** 4.612*** 
         
Panel B: Seller parent ² Buyer parent 
FIRM 
0.0042 
(0.95) 
0.0007 
(0.34) 
      
IND1   
-0.0088 
(-1.06) 
-0.0093 
(-1.89)* 
    
IND2     
-0.0199 
(-1.52) 
-0.0141 
(-1.69)* 
  
ECON       
-0.0023 
(-0.37) 
0.0073 
(1.71)* 
         
LN (FSIZE) 
-0.0031 
(-3.12)*** 
-0.0022 
(-2.75)*** 
-0.0031 
(-3.16)*** 
-0.0022 
(-2.82)*** 
-0.0031 
(-3.08)*** 
-0.0022 
(-2.83)*** 
-0.0031 
(-3.14)*** 
-0.0022 
(-2.75)*** 
MTB 
0.0000 
(0.18) 
-0.0002 
(-0.34) 
0.0001 
(0.23) 
-0.0002 
(-0.31) 
0.0001 
(0.24) 
-0.0001 
(-0.31) 
0.0000 
(0.15) 
-0.0002 
(-0.33) 
RELATE 
0.0014 
(0.47) 
-0.0010 
(-0.50) 
0.0014 
(0.48) 
-0.0007 
(-0.39) 
0.0012 
(0.40) 
-0.0009 
(-0.48) 
0.0014 
(0.47) 
-0.0012 
(-0.66) 
CLUSTER 
0.0067 
(1.55) 
-0.0006 
(-0.29) 
0.0067 
(1.50) 
-0.0008 
(-0.35) 
0.0066 
(1.48) 
-0.0005 
(-0.24) 
0.0068 
(1.56) 
-0.0006 
(-0.28) 
Intercept 
0.0461 
(3.65)*** 
0.0380 
(3.73)*** 
0.0487 
(3.69)*** 
0.0393 
(3.80)*** 
0.0486 
(3.61)*** 
0.0392 
(3.79)*** 
0.0473 
(3.67)*** 
0.0375 
(3.62)*** 
Number of 
observations 
2,280 7,287 2,280 7,287 2,280 7,287 2,280 7,287 
Adjusted-R2  0.009 0.004 0.009 0.005 0.011 0.005 0.009 0.005 
F-statistic 2.335* 3.573*** 2.530** 3.472*** 2.302* 3.496*** 2.746** 5.502*** 
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Panel C: Seller unit ² Buyer parent; Small firms only 
FIRM 
0.0036 
(0.71) 
0.0000 
(0.00) 
      
IND1   
-0.0183 
(-1.84)* 
-0.0076 
(-0.93) 
    
IND2     
-0.0068 
(-0.44) 
-0.0260 
(-1.81)* 
  
ECON       
-0.0078 
(-0.82) 
0.0219 
(2.71)*** 
         
LN (FSIZE) 
-0.0021 
(-0.90) 
-0.0028 
(-1.16) 
-0.0025 
(-1.08) 
-0.0029 
(-1.18) 
-0.0022 
(-0.95) 
-0.0030 
(-1.24) 
-0.0021 
(-0.92) 
-0.0026 
(-1.08) 
MTB 
0.0001 
(0.53) 
-0.0002 
(-0.28) 
0.0002 
(0.81) 
-0.0002 
(-0.25) 
0.0002 
(0.58) 
-0.0001 
(-0.21) 
0.0001 
(0.51) 
-0.0002 
(-0.25) 
RELATE 
0.0040 
(0.79) 
-0.0017 
(-0.49) 
0.0047 
(0.95) 
-0.0016 
(-0.46) 
0.0041 
(0.81) 
-0.0017 
(-0.49) 
0.0042 
(0.85) 
-0.0019 
(-0.54) 
CLUSTER 
0.0077 
(1.77)* 
0.0011 
(0.29) 
0.0076 
(1.76)* 
0.0011 
(0.29) 
0.0078 
(1.78)* 
0.0015 
(0.40) 
0.0078 
(1.80)* 
0.0008 
(0.23) 
Intercept 
0.0295 
(1.03) 
0.0462 
(1.63) 
0.0357 
(1.26) 
0.0481 
(1.65) 
0.0315 
(1.11) 
0.0493 
(1.72)* 
0.0313 
(1.11) 
0.0421 
(1.48) 
Number of 
observations 
1,567 3,261 1,567 3,261 1,567 3,261 1,567 3,261 
Adjusted-R2  0.004 0.002 0.007 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.006 
F-statistic 1.255 0.562 3.061** 0.618 1.719 1.032 1.583 2.343* 
 
Panel D: Seller parent ² Buyer parent; Small firms only 
FIRM 
-0.0003 
(-0.04) 
0.0016 
(0.44) 
      
IND1   
-0.0141 
(-0.89) 
-0.0104 
(-1.20) 
    
IND2     
-0.0297 
(-1.58) 
-0.0159 
(-1.19) 
  
ECON       
-0.0032 
(-0.21) 
0.0176 
(2.41)** 
         
LN (FSIZE) 
-0.0031 
(-1.35) 
-0.0025 
(-1.08) 
-0.0033 
(-1.44) 
-0.0026 
(-1.14) 
-0.0031 
(-1.40) 
-0.0026 
(-1.14) 
-0.0031 
(-1.34) 
-0.0023 
(-1.02) 
MTB 
0.0001 
(0.47) 
-0.0001 
(-0.22) 
0.0002 
(0.71) 
-0.0001 
(-0.17) 
0.0002 
(0.70) 
-0.0001 
(-0.17) 
0.0001 
(0.46) 
-0.0001 
(-0.19) 
RELATE 
-0.0051 
(-1.21) 
-0.0001 
(-0.02) 
-0.0051 
(-1.25) 
0.0002 
(0.08) 
-0.0053 
(-1.24) 
0.0000 
(0.00) 
-0.0051 
(-1.21) 
-0.0003 
(-0.09) 
CLUSTER 
0.0092 
(1.45) 
0.0018 
(0.54) 
0.0094 
(1.49) 
0.0017 
(0.51) 
0.0091 
(1.43) 
0.0020 
(0.61) 
0.0092 
(1.48) 
0.0017 
(0.53) 
Intercept 
0.0501 
(1.85)* 
0.0398 
(1.51) 
0.0537 
(1.95)* 
0.0430 
(1.58) 
0.0523 
(1.95)* 
0.0425 
(1.58) 
0.0502 
(1.87)* 
0.0371 
(1.39) 
Number of 
observations 
1,036 3,792 1,036 3,792 1,036 3,792 1,036 3,792 
Adjusted-R2  0.004 0.001 0.006 0.002 0.009 0.002 0.004 0.004 
F-statistic 0.859 0.412 1.281 0.639 1.716 0.615 1.141 1.973* 
The table reports OLS regressions of three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding asset divestment 
announcements for small firms against individual measures of financial distress conditions and control variables, and 
conditioned by the relatedness of the buyer and seller of the assets. All variables are defined in Table 1. T-statistics are 
shown in parenthesis and are derived from standard errors clustered at the Datastream level 6 industry level. ***, **, and 
* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 13 
Regressions of cumulative abnormal returns surrounding divestment announcements, deal size and financial 
distress conditions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
FIRM 
0.0017 
(0.76) 
   
IND 1 
 -0.0024 
(-0.61) 
  
IND 2 
  -0.0017 
(-0.36) 
 
ECON 
  
 
0.0096 
(2.72)*** 
     
DSIZE 
0.0206 
(2.18)** 
0.0255 
(2.72)*** 
0.0188 
(1.70)* 
0.0217 
(2.47)** 
DSIZE * FIRM 
-0.0215 
(-1.52) 
 
  
DSIZE * IND 1 
 -0.0490 
(-2.16)*** 
  
DSIZE * IND 2 
  -0.0350 
(-1.30) 
 
DSIZE * ECON 
  
 
-0.0554 
(-1.44) 
     
LN (FSIZE) 
-0.0024 
(-3.54)*** 
-0.0023 
(-3.53)*** 
-0.0024 
(-3.54)*** 
-0.0023 
(-3.42)*** 
MTB 
-0.0002 
(-1.25) 
-0.0002 
(-1.03) 
-0.0002 
(-1.15) 
-0.0002 
(-1.21) 
RELATE 
0.0004 
(0.31) 
0.0005 
(0.40) 
0.0003 
(0.22) 
0.0004 
(0.30) 
CLUSTER 
0.0028 
(1.29) 
0.0027 
(1.24) 
0.0028 
(1.33) 
0.0027 
(1.25) 
     
Intercept 
0.0392 
(4.42)*** 
0.0387 
(4.37)*** 
0.0394 
(4.34)*** 
0.0376 
(4.19)*** 
     
Number of observations 6,098 6,098 6,098 6,098 
Adjusted-R2  0.011 0.016 0.012 0.014 
F-statistic 3.10*** 3.28*** 2.81** 4.82*** 
The table reports OLS regressions of three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding asset divestment 
announcements against individual measures of financial distress conditions, control variables, and deal size. All variables 
are defined in Table 1. T-statistics are shown in parenthesis and are derived from standard errors clustered at the 
Datastream level 6 industry level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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Appendix A 
Industry-wide distress and divestment announcements 
DS level 6 industry 
Industry 
code 
Count 
Fraction 
of sample 
IND 1 IND 2 
Exploration & Production 50 152 1.42% 1991, 1998, 2008 1998 
Integrated Oil & Gas 97 395 3.69% - - 
Oil Equipment & Services 51 71 0.66% 1992, 2002, 2008 2002 
Pipelines 52 0 0.00% - - 
Renewable Energy 
Equipment 
74 2 0.02% 2008 - 
Alternative Fuels 83 2 0.02% 2007, 2008 - 
Commodity Chemicals 92 95 0.89% - - 
Specialty Chemicals 33 462 4.31% 2008 - 
Forestry 38 3 0.03% - - 
Paper 82 21 0.20% 2008 - 
Aluminum 93 0 0.00% - - 
Nonferrous Metals 54 6 0.06% 2008 - 
Iron & Steel 56 48 0.45% 2008 2008 
Coal 49 14 0.13% 2008 - 
Diamonds & Gemstones 89 4 0.04% 2008 2008 
General Mining 122 320 2.99% 1990, 1992, 2008 1990 
Gold Mining 119 28 0.26% 
1988, 1990, 1992, 1997, 2001, 
2008 
2001 
Platinum & Precious Metals 78 55 0.51% 2008 2008 
Building Materials & Fixtures 30 470 4.38% 2008 - 
Heavy Construction 39 138 1.29% 2008 - 
Aerospace 98 113 1.05% 2008 - 
Defense 44 89 0.83% - - 
Containers & Packaging 70 113 1.05% 1998, 2008 2008 
Diversified Industrials 101 187 1.74% - - 
Electrical Components & 
Equipment 
37 165 1.54% 2001, 2008 2001 
Electronic Equipment 57 183 1.71% 2001, 2002, 2007, 2008 - 
Commercial Vehicles & 
Trucks 
117 21 0.20% 1990, 2008 - 
Industrial Machinery 43 588 5.49% 2008 2008 
Delivery Services 40 9 0.08% 1990, 2001 - 
Marine Transportation 99 47 0.44% 2008 - 
Railroads 81 0 0.00% - - 
Transportation Services 64 171 1.60% 2008 - 
Trucking 131 38 0.35% - - 
Business Support Services 86 635 5.92% 2008 - 
Business Training & 
Employment Agencies 
134 100 0.93% 1990, 2001, 2002, 2008 2001, 2002 
Financial Administration 46 54 0.50% 2008 - 
Industrial Suppliers 32 92 0.86% 2008 2008 
Waste & Disposal Services 47 30 0.28% 2008 2008 
Automobiles 65 3 0.03% 1990, 2008 1990 
Auto Parts 63 123 1.15% 2002, 2008 2002 
Tires 53 0 0.00% - - 
Brewers 67 54 0.50% - - 
Distillers & Vintners 68 140 1.31% 2006 - 
Soft Drinks 114 2 0.02% - - 
Farming & Fishing 35 24 0.22% 2008 - 
Food Products 71 795 7.42% 2008 - 
Durable Household Products 59 43 0.40% 1998, 2008 1998 
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Nondurable Household 
Products 
62 64 0.60% 2007, 2008 - 
Furnishings 60 71 0.66% 2004, 2008 - 
Home Construction 36 113 1.05% 1990, 2008 1990, 2008 
Consumer Electronics 75 49 0.46% 2008 - 
Recreational Products 155 11 0.10% 2000 - 
Toys 61 6 0.06% 1990, 1997, 2000, 2008 - 
Clothing & Accessories 69 213 1.98% 1990, 2008 2008 
Footwear 153 2 0.02% - - 
Personal Products 48 16 0.15% - - 
Tobacco 79 92 0.86% - - 
Health Care Providers 45 26 0.24% 2002, 2008, 2011 - 
Medical Equipment 132 105 0.98% 2002, 2008 2002, 2008 
Medical Supplies 103 19 0.18% 2001, 2007, 2008 2001, 2007 
Biotechnology 157 76 0.71% 1998, 2001, 2002, 2008 1998, 2002, 2008 
Pharmaceuticals 95 187 1.74% 2008 - 
Drug Retailers 120 46 0.43% - - 
Food Retailers & 
Wholesalers 
88 120 1.12% 2008 - 
Apparel Retailers 66 133 1.24% 1990, 1998, 2008 2008 
Broadline Retailers 87 59 0.55% 2008 - 
Home Improvement 
Retailers 
85 52 0.49% 1998, 2008 - 
Specialized Consumer 
Services 
156 10 0.09% 2000, 2001, 2008 2001 
Specialty Retailers 90 371 3.46% 2008 - 
Broadcasting & 
Entertainment 
115 273 2.55% 1990, 2001, 2002, 2008 2001, 2002 
Media Agencies 41 202 1.88% 1990, 1992, 2001, 2002, 2008 2001 
Publishing 84 439 4.10% 2001, 2008 2008 
Airlines 129 56 0.52% 1992, 2008 - 
Gambling 100 121 1.13% 2001, 2006, 2008 2006 
Hotels 80 227 2.12% 1990, 2008 - 
Recreational Services 55 191 1.78% 1990, 1992, 2001, 2002, 2008 1992 
Restaurants & Bars 72 256 2.39% 2008 - 
Travel & Tourism 94 84 0.78% 2008 - 
Fixed Line 
Telecommunications 
142 145 1.35% 2000, 2001, 2002, 2008 2000, 2002 
Mobile Telecommunications 143 86 0.80% 2001, 2002, 2008 2001, 2002 
Computer Services 150 185 1.73% 1990, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2008 2000, 2002, 2008 
Internet 151 31 0.29% 2000, 2001, 2002 - 
Software 58 332 3.10% 1990, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2008 2000, 2002 
Computer Hardware 34 20 0.19% 1990, 2001, 2002, 2008 2001 
Electronic Office Equipment 105 13 0.12% - - 
Semiconductors 130 10 0.09% 2000, 2001, 2002, 2008 - 
Telecommunications 
Equipment 
126 101 0.94% 2001, 2002, 2008 2001, 2002 
The table presents the number of divestments by Datastream level 6 industry groups for a sample of divestment 
announcements by UK firms from 1988 to 2009. The sample consists of non-financial and non-utility firms in the FTSE 
All-Share Index of the London Stock Exchange.  
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Appendix B 
Probit selection models of the probability of divesting assets 
 (1) (2) 
FIRM 
-0.1208 
(-3.04)*** 
-0.1447 
(-3.52)*** 
IND 1 
-0.3574 
(-5.06)*** 
 
IND 2 
 -0.3900 
(-4.02)*** 
ECON 
-0.0807 
(-3.26)*** 
-0.1359 
(-6.19)*** 
   
LN (FSIZE) 
-0.0978 
(-4.79)*** 
-0.0973 
(-4.75)*** 
CAPLO 
0.1521 
(4.36)*** 
0.1495 
(4.27)*** 
NON CASH WC 
-0.0664 
(-2.86)*** 
-0.0646 
(-2.80)*** 
PE 
-0.0001 
(-1.32) 
-0.0001 
(-1.32) 
MTB 
-0.0009 
(-2.85)*** 
-0.0009 
(-2.95)*** 
SALES GROWTH 
-0.0034 
(-1.17) 
-0.0033 
(-1.18) 
ROA 
0.1207 
(3.12)*** 
0.1280 
(3.18)*** 
   
Intercept 
-0.7454 
(-5.75)*** 
-0.7595 
(-5.83)*** 
   
Number of observations 51,984 51,952 
Pseudo R2  0.017 0.014 
Log pseudo likelihood  -14621.53 -14664.608 
:DOGƷ2 92.47*** 129.65*** 
The table reports probit regressions of the likelihood of divesting assets for a sample of divestment announcements by 
UK firms from 1988 to 2009. The sample consists of non-financial and non-utility firms. The dependent variable is set 
equal to one if the firm announces a divestment in the subsequent financial year, and zero otherwise. NONCASH WC is 
current assets minus cash divided by current liabilities. PE is year-end share price divided by earnings per share. SALES 
GROWTH is the change in revenue over the subsequent financial year. ROA is the ratio of earnings before interest, 
taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) divided by book value of total assets. All remaining variables are defined 
in Table 1. Z-statistics are shown in parenthesis and are derived from standard errors clustered at the Datastream level 6 
industry level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.  
 
